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I. INTRODUCTION
Change is hard. Inertia begets inertia. The American exclusionary Rule' has
been in place for thirty-eight years, meaning that two generations of lawyers have
practiced in the wake of Mapp v. Ohio,2 and that the vast majority of criminal law
practitioners have never practiced under any other rule. Naturally, any proposal to
alter a long standing, entrenched rule in the criminal justice system will evoke
serious challenge. Despite the mounting evidence that the Rule fails in its essential
function,3 and the fact that the Rule exacts tremendous costs,4 the exclusionary rule
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1. The American exclusionary rule will be referred to herein as either "the exclusionary rule" or
"the Rule."
2. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3. "The exclusionary rule is ... a judicially created means of deterring illegal searches and
seizures." Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 118 S. Ct. 2014, 2019 (1998) (citations
omitted). The Rule's effectiveness as a deterrent of police misconduct has been questioned frequently
over the last thirty years, based on the absence of empirical support for the rule's value as a deterrent.
See L. Timothy Perrin, H. Mitchell Caldwell, and Carol A. Chase, with Ronald W. Fagan, If it's Broken,
Fix It: Moving Beyond the Exclusionary Rule, 83 IOWA L. REV. 669, 711-36 (1998) (describing an
empirical study of the extent to which police are deterred by the exclusionary rule and concluding that
the Rule does not effectively deter police misconduct); see also Bivins v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 416 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (observing that there
survives mostly, it seems, because of inertia and the perceived absence of any
viable alternatives.5
The critiquers of the proposed civil administrative remedy have rightfully
focused on perceived problems in the proposed remedy, while failing to offer any
justification for retaining the existing exclusionary rule.' Part of a thorough
evaluation of any new approach should include a comparative analysis of the new
proposal with the status quo. Reading the Totten,7 Fellmeth,8 and Levenson9
articles, one is hard-pressed to identify any passages extolling the virtues of the
exclusionary rule. They do not claim that the Supreme Court got it precisely right
in 1961.10 Nor do they claim that the current rule strikes the thoughtful,
proportionate balance necessary to meet the competing goals of preserving
individual liberties and protecting public safety. Perhaps the length of time we
have lived with the Rule has numbed us to its defects, but its lack of support, even
among those critical of our proposal, is very telling.
Even if the Rule is not fatally flawed, it has tremendous drawbacks. And, as
the late Justice Blackmun noted fifteen years ago, "[i]f a single principle may be
drawn from this Court's exclusionary rule decisions, from Weeks through Mapp
... it is that the scope of the exclusionary rule is subject to change in light of
changing judicial understanding about the effects of the rule outside the confines
of the courtroom."' 1 Our proposal was crafted with Justice Blackmun in mind. We
firmly believe our proposal is a workable solution to a difficult issue, and we
appreciate the opportunity to respond to the criticisms raised by our colleagues.
In Part II we respond to criticisms of our empirical study of law enforcement
officials from Ventura County, California and elsewhere (the "Pepperdine Study"),
which formed part of the basis for our proposed administrative remedy. 12 Part III
addresses the criticisms of our proposed civil administrative remedy to partially
is no empirical evidence to demonstrate that the Rule deters police misconduct).
4. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 674-78 (summarizing the costs of the exclusionary rule,
including lost prosecutions, reduced charges, erosion of rights under the Fourth Amendment, loss of
police officer integrity, and the time, effort, and monetary costs required to process motions to
suppress).
5. See id. at 672-73.
6. See id. at 743-54 (discussing the proposed administrative remedy to partially replace the
exclusionary rule).
7. See Gregory D. Totten et al., The Exclusionary Rule: Fix it, But Fix it Right, 26 PEPP. L. REV.
887 (1999) (responding to the exclusionary rule critique of Perrin et al.).
8. See Robert C. Fellmeth, The Optimum Remedy for Constitutional Breaches: Multi-accessed
CivilPenalties in Equity, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 923 (1999) (providing a solution to the exclusionary rule's
shortcomings).
9. See Laurie L. Levenson, Administrative Replacements: How Much Can They Do?, 26 PEPP. L.
REV. 879 (1999) (critiquing Perrin et al.'s administrative remedy to the exclusionary rule).
10. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
11. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,928 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
12. See infra notes 17-65 and accompanying text.
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replace the exclusionary rule (the "Pepperdine Proposal'?),3 including criticisms
that it will not be cost-effective; that it will not be efficient; that it will overdeter
police officers; that it will increase the incentive for police perjury; and that it fails
to right constitutional wrongs. 4 In Part IV we address issues related to the
implementation of our proposal, concluding that state and/or federal legislatures
should be able to enact our proposal consistent with notions of federalism. 5 We
conclude in Part V with a demonstration of how our proposal will work when
applied to the facts of five exclusionary rule cases and one police search that did
not lead to a prosecution.
6
II. RESPONSE TO CRITICISMS OF THE EMPIRICAL STUDY
It is axiomatic that important decisions should be based upon good
information. The more insight a person has into a perplexing problem, the more
likely it is that those involved will be able to identify an effective and satisfactory
fix. In deciding whether the exclusionary rule should be retained, empirical data
can provide important information about the relative costs and benefits of the
Rule.'7 Yet, as Professor Heise pointed out in his symposium piece, "whether the
exclusionary rule deters illegal police conduct remains a vexingly complicated
research question and one that thrusts researchers into murky areas inhabited by
well-guarded human motivations within a complex social model."' 8 Thus, while
recognizing the utility of empirical research, we also acknowledge its limitations
in unearthing why law enforcement officials act the way they do.'9
Despite the problems in some of our questions and despite the nebulous nature
of the subject matter being tested, we believe the task was worth the considerable
time and effort. And despite the particular criticisms of our study set forth in the
commentaries, we believe some significant truths emerged, which should not be
overlooked. To castigate the study for some particular and very limited concerns
13. The proposed civil administrative remedy is sometimes referred to herein as the "Pepperdine
Proposal" solely for ease of reference and does not imply that the proposal has been endorsed by
Pepperdine University.
14. See infra notes 66-190 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 191-236 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 237-359 and accompanying text.
17. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 678, 711-12.
18. Michael Heise, The Importance of Being Empirical, 26 PEPP. L. REV 807,850 (1999); see also
Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 716
(1970) (analyzing the effects of the exclusionary rule through case studies).
19. See Oaks, supra note 18, at 716 (noting that a reliable measurement of the exclusionary rule's
deterrent effect is impossible); Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 711 ("The motivations of law enforcement
officials defy direct observation, and that constitutes one of the most imposing barriers to the study of
the rule.").
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is to throw out the baby with the bath water.
First and foremost, our study confirms that police officers do not adequately
understand the complicated law of search and seizure. Officers answered barely
more than 50% of the search and seizure hypothetical questions correctly, and
fewer than two-thirds of the hypothetical questions overall. 20 Even-when the
officers answered "correctly," they often failed to understand the rationale or
reason for the result.2 ' For the Rule to effectively deter police misconduct, those
trusted with the execution of our criminal laws must understand the reason that
evidence is suppressed. The second truth to emerge from the Pepperdine Study is
that the lack of a systemized methodology to communicate the results of
suppression hearings to the involved officers undermines the specific deterrent
effect of exclusion.22 Absent communication about the results of the suppression
hearing, officers are left uninformed as to whether their behavior conformed to the
Fourth Amendment, and they miss a valuable opportunity to learn what they should
do under similar circumstances in the future.The third truth our study confirmed is that the exclusionary rule has
contributed to a profound loss of police integrity. 3 The importance of this truth
cannot be overstated, for the integrity of those trusted with the execution of our
laws is at the heart of our system of justice. Thus, while there may be valid
particular criticisms, a broader perspective containing these larger truths is critical.
Two of the contributors to this symposium have considered the problems
engendered by attempting to use empirical evidence as a scholarly tool.24 Professor
Heise, while calling for an increase in the use of empirical research in legal
scholarship, made a good case for the difficulty of undertaking this type of
research. He emphasized the degree of caution that must be used in evaluating data
based upon responses that require some assessment as to whether the responses are
likely to be truthful.2' He also noted that restricting our study to Ventura County
limited the representativeness of the data drawn from the study, as does the
response rate to our survey. 6 We concede the existence of these limitations to our
study, which we have openly disclosed, and are grateful to Professor Heise for his
insightful comments.
Totten and his co-authors also raised a number of concerns about our study.
Totten urged that officers do not need to know the nuances of the law in order to
correctly apply it,27 and pointed to three problems in our study to support his
argument: (1) our failure to place sufficient importance on officers getting the right
20. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 728-29 & tbl.6.
21. See id. at 729 nn.436-37 (discussing distribution of answers of respondents among possible
answers).
22. See id. at 722-25.
23. See id. at 725-27.
24. See Heise, supra note 18, at 807; Totten et al., supra note 7, at 887.
25. See Heise, supra note 18, at 832.
26. See id. at 832-33.
27. See Totten et al., supra note 7, at 897.
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result, even if they got it for the wrong reason; (2) the failure to differentiate
between police officer errors of inclusion or exclusion; and (3) the validity of paper
and pencil self-report testing. 8 Totten ignored the more substantial problems*
created by the exclusionary rule while focusing on these more obscure points.
First, Totten argued that it is not necessary for officers to understand Fourth
Amendment law to correctly apply it, and he analogized it to the difficulty an
average person would have understanding the difference between the degrees of
murder.29 This analogy misses the point. Most people would still recognize that
the act of killing another is wrong. The results of our survey provide support for
our conclusion that many times the officers cannot determine whether their conduct
is "wrong," and therefore, are unable to conform their conduct to what the law
requires.3"
Police officers must understand the rule of law. While an officer may
conclude that evidence is admissible under the exclusionary rule because, for
example; it would inevitably have been discovered," this may overlook the fact that
a constitutional violation has occurred. In Nix v. Williams,32 the officers
transporting Nix made the now-famous Christian burial speech to procure Nix's
murder confession. 33 The Supreme Court held the confession to murder was
obtained in violation of the defendant's rights,3" but ultimately concluded that the
condition of the victim's body was admissible based upon the inevitable discovery
rule.35 Had the officers more clearly understood the underlying constitutional
principles, their conduct may have secured a lawful confession. While Totten
would like us to believe that understanding the law underlying the exclusionary rule
is not necessary as long as the correct result is reached, such reasoning fails to
recognize that not knowing the law may result in constitutional violations even if
the admissibility of evidence is preserved.
The responses to several of the hypothetical questions in our survey revealed
that the responses from the officers were spread among the four available
answers. 36 This supports the notion that officers are regularly unclear about what
the law requires and that obedience of the law is a matter of fortuity, rather than
conscious effort.
28. See id. at 894.
29. See id. at 897.
30. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 727-29.
31. See, e.g., Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,444 (1984) (holding that the inevitable discovery rule
overrides the exclusionary rule).
32. 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
33. See id. at 441; Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 392 (1977).
34. See Brewer, 430 U.S. at 405-06.
35. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 432.
36. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 728-29.
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The second point raised by Totten is that the hypothetical questions failed to
distinguish between errors of exclusion (where officers incorrectly decided against
seizing evidence that would have been admissible) and errors of inclusion (where
officers incorrectly decided to seize evidence wherethe law would not sanction the
seizure).37 Totten argued that errors of exclusion would suggest that the
exclusionary rule is too strong a deterrent, and would result in officers not seizing
evidence they should in fact seize, while errors of inclusion would support our
conclusion that the Rule fails as a deterrent.3" Consequently, for Totten, the error
rate by officers is inconclusive in determining the extent of deterrence of the
exclusionary rule if the questions do not differentiate between errors of inclusion
and errors of exclusion.
To an extent, Totten is right. The Pepperdine Study could have provided more
insightful results had more of our questions provided a better basis for
differentiating between errors of inclusion and errors of exclusion. However, at
least one of our hypothetical questions, C-8, does permit differentiation between
errors of exclusion and errors of inclusion.39 And the results of that question
support our contention that the exclusionary rule inadequately deters Fourth
Amendment violations. The correct answer to question C-8' was that the evidence
is inadmissible. While 43.5% of the officers responded correctly to the question,
41
another 23.6% answered that it was inadmissible, but for the wrong reason.42
30.3% of the officers incorrectly answered that they could legally seize the
narcotics 3.4  Thus, 30.3% of the answers were errors of inclusion, again lending
support to our conclusion that the exclusionary rule fails to significantly deter
Fourth Amendment violations.
37. See Totten et al., supra note 7, at 894.
38. See id.
39. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 729 n.436.
40. Question C-8 provided as follows:
With probable cause that a drug transaction has just occurred, officers arrested a drug suspect
just outside his house. At the time of the arrest they believed there was another person
involved in the same drug enterprise. Prior to arrest, another person was seen coming and
going from the house. Immediately after the arrest, officers entered the house and conducted
a "protective sweep" for other persons who might pose a threat or dispose of evidence. During
the "protective sweep" the officers seized narcotics from a bedroom closet. The seized
narcotics are:
(a) Admissible, because the officers had the right to look in the bedroom closet;
(b) Admissible, because officers may search for fruits of the crime;
(c) Inadmissible, because the officers had no search warrant;
(d) Inadmissible, because the officers could perform a protective sweep but not
seize narcotics.
Id. at 759.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id.
976
[Vol. 26: 971, 1999] Response
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Totten also argued that the officers responding to our questionnaire had higher
error rates than they do in real life." As support, he noted that the average number
of suppression hearings the responding officers had been involved in whs between
fifteen and eighteen over an entire career." This, he contended, is a relatively
small number and is an indication that the vast majority of seizures are performed
in accordance with the law.' First and foremost, Totten failed to recognize that
suppression motions do not provide an accurate measurement of police misconduct.
Some police errors result in the prosecution's dismissal of charges or a plea bargain
and some victims are never prosecuted at all. Hence, a portion of police
misconduct avoids suppression motions altogether. Remarkably, more than 20%
of the officers who participated in our study claimed that they had never given
testimony in a suppression hearing,4' leading to the conclusion that a substantial
number of officers had never made a mistake, or the officers had assignments in
which they had no responsibility for searches or arrests, or any misconduct by the
officers never resulted in a suppression hearing.
Second, Totten overstated the significance of our study's mean number of
suppression hearings per officer (fifteen to eighteen). Totten estimated that each
officer made about twenty-five arrests a year and "conservatively" extrapolated that
number into "100 search and seizure decisions" for each officer each year.' Totten
cited the Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime Reports of 1995 to
support his arrest statistic49 and concluded that officers must be getting it mostly
right because they are involved in only a few suppression hearings out of thousands
of such decisions over a career.5" Of course, the crime statistics that Totten cited
are national statistics, and Ventura County has decidedly less crime than the
national average. As we pointed out in our study, Thousand Oaks and Simi Valley,
two of the largest cities in Ventura County, are regularly listed as being among the
safest cities in America.5 Thus, there are fewer arrests in Ventura County than
elsewhere, and one might logically assume there are fewer search and seizure
decisions for police.
44. See Totten et al., supra note 7, at 896.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 723 tbl.3 (stating that 19.5% of Ventura County Police
Officers, 23.9% of Ventura County Sheriff's Officers, and 27.8% of a third group of officers had
responded that they had never testified in a suppression hearing).
48. See id. at 896.
49. See id. at 896 n.36.
50. See id. at 897.
51. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 713 nn.375-77.
Third, Totten's estimate that officers face 100 search and seizure decisions per
officer per year is wildly speculative and is not drawn from any credible source.
Too many variables have to be accounted for to make Totten's estimate reliable,
thereby rendering the figure meaningless. Do we factor in high crime areas versus
low crime areas?52 Suburban areas versus urban areas versus rural areas?5 3 Do we
distinguish between arrests of individuals versus searches of houses? Is writing a
traffic ticket an arrest involving a search and seizure decision?
Fourth, Totten wrongly criticized our study for not collecting data about the
number of times officers conducted searches or actually seized evidence or the
number of times they chose not to collect evidence for fear of exclusion.54 Such
an endeavor would have been an exercise in futility. It would be impossible for
officers to accurately recall the number of search and seizure situations they had
encountered over a career, regardless of the length of their service as officers.
Indeed, it was our belief in formulating the study that it would be difficult for
officers to accurately estimate the number of suppression hearings in which they
were involved,55 an event much more memorable than a routine search by an
officer. We certainly never intended for the number of suppression hearings
estimated by the officers to serve as the basis for an argument about how often the
officers get it right. Furthermore the information gathered by our study does not
provide sufficiently precise information to support the conclusions reached by
Totten.
Finally, Totten criticized "paper and pencil" tests, arguing that they are not a
useful indicator of real world conduct.5 6 While to some extent such criticism is
valid, these tests remain the best available testing tool.57 Additionally, our
hypothetical questions were based upon decisions by the United States Supreme
Court,"8 and, therefore, are "real world" examples.59 We note the validity of the
Totten criticism of "self-report" testing: Respondents may report their behavior to
52. See id. (noting that Ventura County is unusually safe).
53. See id. (indicating that Ventura County is largely a suburban county).
54. See Totten et al., supra note 7, at 896 (concluding that without information about the total
number of search and seizure opportunities for officers it "is impossible to compute the rate at which
officers confront difficult search situations and the proportion of times they were actually deterred from
collecting evidence.").
55. The memory difficulties we anticipated may be illustrated by the large number of officers who
responded to the questions about the number of suppression hearings in which they had testified by
rounding off their answers and by the extremely large range of responses, from no suppression hearings
to more than one hundred. The most popular answers to the number of suppression motions were zero,
one, two, five, ten, and twenty, although some identified fifty, one hundred, or more than one hundred
hearings. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 723 tbl.3.
56. See Totten et al. supra note 7, at 897-98.
57. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 711 (noting the importance of measuring the direct effects of
the exclusionary rule on police officer behavior and the inability of other evaluative methods to
ascertain this information because of their indirect nature).
58. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 714-15.
59. See id.
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be what they believe the questioner would find to be the most appropriate response,
rather than what actually occurred, and "tests do not always perfectly predict the
behavior of the tested individual."' However, while paper and pencil tests are not
perfect indicators of past or future conduct, they have long been regarded as an
invaluable tool in human behavior research and usually provide a valuable first step
in predicting human behavior.6 Moreover, in our study, any self-reporting bias
would have caused the participants to minimize the extent of evidence suppression
they had suffered and the extent of their awareness of police deception and not to
exaggerate those facts. We noted in discussing our findings that the participating
officers almost certainly understated the extent to which they were aware of
deception by fellow officers.62 Similarly, any self-reporting bias likely played no
significant role in the officers' responses to the hypothetical questions. If anything,
one would expect the officers to expend additional time and effort on the questions,
above and beyond the time available in the field, to make sure they answered them
correctly.
Thus, while we readily recognize the limitations of our study, and the limits of
all empirical studies based upon self-report questionnaires, we stand by the
conclusions that we have drawn from our research.63 Moreover, we draw strength
from the other empirical studies that we cited in our Article.' As described in that
Article, many of those studies came to conclusions similar to the ones that we
reached.6
I. RESPONSES TO CRITICISMS OF THE PEPPERDINE PROPOSAL
A. Cost Comparison: The Exclusionary Rule vs. The Proposed
Administrative Remedy
The creation of a new administrative agency to deal with charges of police
misconduct has risks and costs, which, at least superficially, may form a basis for
an attack on the Pepperdine Proposal. However, any such attack is blunted by a
comparative examination of the risks and costs inherent under both the
exclusionary rule and our proposal. Therefore, just as the critiques have
appropriately probed our administrative alternative for its costs, it is necessary to
60. See Totten et al., supra note 7, at 897-98.
61. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 678.
62. See id. at 726-27.
63. Seeid. at711-34.
64. See generally id. at Part Il (discussing the findings of numerous previous studies).
65. See id.
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probe the current approach for its costs. Only through such a comparative analysis
can the relative costs and benefits of each be compared. We will compare the
following: the costs in lost prosecutions,6 the political costs,67 the monetary and
time costs,68 the loss of individual rights,69 and the cost to police integrity.70
1. Cost in Lost Prosecutions
One of the clear costs of the current system is the cost in lost prosecutions.
United States v. Bayless7 illustrates the failings of the Rule. The exclusionary rule
does not take into account the nature of the crime, the nature and type of evidence
subject to exclusion, or whether intentionally culpable conduct on the part of the
officers is involved.72 Judge Baer's decision in Bayless left the public outraged to
see yet another career criminal go free despite overwhelming evidence of his
guilt.73 The defendant's disproportionate windfall, as much as any other factor,
brings the Rule into disrepute, and it is that lost prosecution which most concerns
the public. The judicial system has tried its best to work around the confines of the
Rule, but is often forced to reach legally farcical conclusions in order to preserve
evidence critical for a conviction.74
From the moment Mapp v. Ohio75 was decided, judges have gone to great
lengths to avoid evidence exclusion which results in lost prosecution. For example,
in a 1963 study conducted by Stuart Nagel,76 47% of respondents reported that
since Mapp, judges in states that had no prior exclusionary rule had broadened the
definition of what constituted a permissible search so as to avoid evidence
exclusion.77
That "broadening" of "permissible searches" is no coincidence. The tortured
interpretations of Fourth Amendment law in the wake of Mapp have created a body
66. See infra notes 71-83 and accompanying text.
67. See infra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
68. See infra notes 89-108 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 109-21 and accompanying text.
70. See infra notes 122-40 and accompanying text.
71. 913 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), vacated, 921 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (applying the
exclusionary rule to suppress a large quantity of illegal drugs); see also Perrin et al., supra note 3, at
671 (analyzing the decision in Bayless).
72. See Bayless, 913 F. Supp. at 237-43.
73. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 671-72. In Bayless, police seized eighty pounds of cocaine
and heroin from the trunk of the defendant's rental car after observing four men stuff two packed duffel
bags into the trunk while the car was parked in a high-crime area during the early-moming hours. See
Bayless, 913 F. Supp. at 234-37. Upon seeing the police, one of the men ran. Id. at 235. Despite the
fact that the officers exhibited no intent to violate the defendant's rights, Judge Bacr suppressed the
evidence as violative of the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 234-35, 242.
74. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); see infra notes 112-15.
75. 367U.S.643(1961).
76. See generally, Stuart S. Nagel, Testing the Effects ofExcluding Illegally Seized Evidence, 1965
Wis. L. REV. 283 (evaluating, through empirical evidence, the effects of the exclusionary rule).
77. See id. at 290.
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of law that is remarkably complicated. 8 Thus, law enforcement must grapple with
an increasingly complicated criminal procedure, with only limited success,
precisely because of its increasing complexity. The result is an emergence of cases
such as Bayless, which bring intense and focused public disdain for the entire
criminal justice system.
This public disdain for lost prosecutions is not without merit. As a National
Institute of Justice Study79 indicated, of those defendants whose cases were
rejected for prosecution because of possible Fourth Amendment violations,
approximately half were re-arrested within the next forty-eight hours. °
Furthermore, two-thirds of those who were released due to possible Fourth
Amendment violations were repeat offenders.8' The cost of the exclusionary rule
is clear, it allows dangerous repeat criminals to return to prey upon the community.
The sheer cost of lost prosecutions resulting from suppression of evidence
under the exclusionary rule is tremendous, and is the greatest cost under the current
system. However, another less visible cost of the Rule is "reduced prosecution."
Prosecutors faced with the specter of evidence exclusion may lack the ability to
fully prosecute cases, but may be able to file less serious charges with the
remaining evidence. In this way, activity that should have resulted in the filing of
a serious felony may result in a less serious felony or even a misdemeanor.
Consequently, instead of receiving a lengthy prison sentence, a defendant may
serve minimal jail time or avoid incarceration entirely. Unfortunately, no study
undertaken thus far has probed this cost, which admittedly would be difficult to
measure precisely.
It is in avoiding the cost of lost or reduced prosecutions that the Pepperdine
Proposal offers its greatest benefit. When evidence is excluded, the guilty will
generally escape conviction and punishment.82 Under the Pepperdine Proposal,
which preserves the admissibility of evidence involving less than intentional police
misconduct, society is safer and the public disdain for the criminal justice system
will give way to a renewed confidence that our system works. Moreover, our
proposed administrative remedy does not view the preservation of individual rights
and public safety as diametrically opposed aims. 3 The competing dynamic that is
78. See infra notes 109-118 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court decisions which
have systematically limited the application of the exclusionary rule in order to preserve the ability of
police to conduct searches).
79. See NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, THE EFFECTS OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE: A STUDY IN
CALIFORNIA 2 (1982) [hereinafter NIJ STUDY].
80. See id. at 16.
81. Seeid.atl8.
82. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 753.
83. See id.
at the heart of the operation of the Rule is eliminated. Our proposal protects
individual rights while still punishing the guilty.
2. The Political Cost: The Loss of Public Confidence in the Criminal
Justice System
Any proposal that suggests the creation of a new administrative agency to
solve a problem is bound to draw an attack. Even without expending any real
thought, the critic has a ready arsenal of generic bullets.84 After all, everyone
knows administrative agencies quickly become bloated, top-heavy, and cost
inefficient. They create rules for their own sake, and generally serve to interpose
yet another level of useless bureaucracy on an already overwrought citizenry. This
almost intuitive attack is offered in a knee-jerk fashion to counter any approach that
involves the creation of a new administrative remedy. One commentator opined
that the creation of an administrative agency is wrong, in part, simply because of
the public disdain for any new bureaucracy. "According to a 1996 Gallup survey,
seventy-one percent of respondents favored a proposition aimed at 'reducing all
government agencies."' 86 Consequently, any such proposal carries with it political
costs.
87
While these arguments may be appealing in a vacuum, they do not stand up
under comparative analysis. If the cost of the unpopularity of a new government
agency is balanced against the loss of public confidence in the criminal justice
system because of lost and reduced prosecutions, the public's dislike of a new
agency may well give way. The specter of a guilty man escaping criminal
conviction because critical evidence was excluded bears an enormous price tag; a
price tag so high as to be the primary focus of the public's disdain for the American
84. The wide spread adoption of sunset laws that are applied to administrative agencies reflects a
legislative assumption that agencies must justify, on a regular basis, their existence, mission, and right
to continue as an arm of govemment. Sunset laws either provide for a set termination date or provide
for periodic review. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 473(e), 101. 1(a) (Deering Supp. 1999). In
California, there is a joint legislative sunset review committee. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 473
(Deering Supp. 1999). State agencies, such as the State Board of Chiropractic Examiners and the State
Board of Osteopathic Examiners, are required by law "to demonstrate a compelling public need for the
continued existence of the board or regulatory program, and that its licensing function is the least
restrictive regulation consistent with the public health, safety, and welfare." See CAL Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 473.15(c) (Deering 1998); see also CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 1000-1 to 1000-5, 3600-1 to
3600-5 (Deering 1998). Agencies that are within the Department of Consumer Affairs, such as those
listed in section 100 of the California Business and Profession Codes, are "subject to a review every
four years to evaluate and determine whether each board has demonstrated a public need for the
continued existence of that board." See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 101.1 (a) (Deering 1998). This
includes such agencies as the Medical Board of California, which licenses physicians. See CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE § 101(b) (Deering 1998).
85. See Levenson, supra note 9, at 881.
86. See id. at 882 (citations omitted).
87. See id.
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criminal justice system.8t If the public were to pick their poison, it would not be
the exclusionary rule. One cannot seriously suggest that an administrative remedy
in place of the exclusionary rule will fail for reasons of political fallout.
3. Monetary and Temporal Cost Comparison of the Current System
to the Proposed Administrative Remedy.
The most basic and obvious cost of both the exclusionary rule and the
Pepperdine Proposal is the cost in time and money necessary to administer each.
Admittedly, an administrative agency to oversee and evaluate claims will be
expensive,89 but so is the current system. Certainly any criticism based on the
expense of our proposal is only valid if it outstrips the costs of the current system.9°
Unfortunately, no study to date has determined the monetary resources expended
in bringing, handling, and disposing of suppression motions under the current
system.91 Yet, we can identify some sources of cost under the exclusionary rule.
The monetary cost to police departments could be measured in the additional man-
hours expended in court appearances solely necessitated by suppression motions. 2
Likewise, the burden on prosecutors is considerable. In the review of cases for
possible filing, prosecutors must screen cases with an eye to potential evidence
exclusion. This may cause cases to be rejected, lesser charges to be filed, or a case
to be sent back to the originating police agency for further investigation.
The costs engendered in case rejection or the filing of lesser charges involve
additional costs.9 3 The immediate costs to police agencies associated with sending
a case back for further work-up is obvious. The costs to prosecutors could also be
measured in the salaried man-hours necessary to research and draft motions in
88. See supra notes 44-65 and accompanying text.
89. See generally Levenson, supra note 9, at 882 (discussing the costs of an administrative
agency).
90. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 752-53 (discussing the costs of the exclusionary rule).
91. Only one study has even touched the surface of assessing such costs in the current exclusionary
rule system. This was the General Accounting Office ("GAO") Study of 1979 which determined,
among other things, that out of a total of 271 staff years assessed in the study, 3.6 of these staff years
were used to process suppression motions. See COMPTROLLER GEN. OFTHE U.S. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
REP. No. GGD-79-45, IMPACT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE ON FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 1,
10 (1979) [hereinafter COMFROLLER'S REPORT]. In addition, the GAO study estimated that 7.6 staff
years available to judicial and law enforcement personnel were used to process such motions. Id.
However, both findings failed to assign a monetary cost to these staff hours. Id.
92. This cost is nebulous, but based on the authors' experience it may be exacerbated by other
factors. Frequently, officers called to testify are off duty, and consequently their court appeirance is
overtime. Additionally, suppression motions are often continued to another date, thereby requiring
another appearance.
93. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
opposition to defense suppression motions, to subpoena and prepare witnesses for
suppression hearings, and to represent the state during those hearings.
The judicial costs of the current system will, in part, be measured in total
salaried hours that judges spend reviewing motions for suppression of evidence and
presiding over suppression hearings.94 So too, monetary costs can be measured in
the salaried man-hours of appellate courtroom judges and personnel that must be
expended to handle appeals arising from suppression motions.
That being noted, the Pepperdine Proposal would eliminate many of these
costs. Except for the most egregious and intentional police misconduct, most
Fourth Amendment rights claims will not be heard in the criminal courts.95 And
even in the administrative agency created to deal with police abuses there will be
fewer claims because the incentive (evidence exclusion) to bring frivolous claims
will have been eliminated." The windfall of evidence exclusion which drives the
high rate of suppression motions under the current system will no longer exist. 7
Moreover, the administrative remedy is such that, even though our proposal
increases the number of potential claimants," meritless claims will be quickly
disposed of before they can substantially burden the agency's resources. 99 Thus,
instead of dealing with search and seizure motions and appeals, prosecutors, law
enforcement, and courts will be able to spend their limited resources on other
budgetary concerns and or reduce their overall budget.
Of course, monetary savings will be inherent in any remedy in which law
enforcement, prosecutors, and courts save time. And, unlike the paucity of data to
illuminate the direct monetary costs, available studies of the exclusionary rule have
considered the amount of time the current system consumes.'oo
The GAO study in 1979 concluded that 3.6 out of 271 staff years were devoted
to handling suppression motions, or 1.3% of the total.'0 1 Further, the GAO study
determined that 30.8% of all suppression motions never made it to the courtroom
94. See COMPTROLLER'S REPORT, supra note 91, at 10 (generally discussing the amount of man-
hours expended by courts on suppression motions).
95. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 753 (noting that under the proposed administrative remedy,
only evidence gathered due to the most egregious intentional police misconduct will be subject to
suppression under the exclusionary rule; other misconduct claims will be handled through the
administrative agency); see also William C. Heffernan & Richard W. Lovely, Evaluating the Fourth
Amendment Exclusionary Rule: The Problem of Police Compliance with the Law, 24 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 311,346 (1991) (study showing that of officers who responded to hypotheticals with answers
that would violate the Fourth Amendment, 70% committed the violation unintentionally).
96. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 752.
97. See id.; see also Oaks, supra note 18, at 681-89 (discussing the increase in suppression motions
after the exclusionary rule was imposed).
98. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (requiring that claimants have some actual damages in
order to recover for civil rights violations); Perrin et al, supra note 3, at 749 (describing claimant's right
to liquidated damages for each violation under the Pepperdine Proposal).
99. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 751-52.
100. See, e.g., COMPTROLLER'S REPORT, supra note 91, at 10.
101. See id.
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because the parties plea bargained."°2 The GAO study revealed that defense
attorneys used suppression motions, with little or no chance for success, as a tool
to improve their client's footing or simply to delay the proceeding. 3
The use of the suppression motion as a strategic tool by defense attorneys
results in a time cost to police departments as well. In the Pepperdine Study,
almost 60% of the participating police officers responded that they had never had
evidence excluded despite their appearance at an average of fifteen to eighteen
suppression hearings."°4 This data confirms that suppression motions are usually
futile, but nonetheless are employed frequently enough to warrant a substantial
number of appearances by officers at suppression motion hearings. 'I
As noted, regardless of whether the suppression motion has merit, its
processing still consumes valuable man-hours under the current system.'°6 Under
the proposed administrative remedy, the time spent handling such motions is, for
the most part, transferred to an administrative agency, thus freeing up law
enforcement, prosecutorial, and judicial time. The number of suppression motions
that will be heard in the courts because of intentional police misconduct will be
only a small fraction of that currently heard. 7 Thus, it is reasonable to conclude
that the fifteen to eighteen suppression motions the average Ventura County peace
officer attends under the current system will dramatically decrease under the
proposed administrative remedy. That time saved can be redistributed to other
societal or law enforcement needs.
Prosecuting attorneys will also save considerable time because the proposed
administrative remedy will eliminate the incentive for defense attorneys to file
frivolous suppression motions. Only the most egregious and intentional police
misconduct will result in suppression." Without having to draft motions in
response to suppression motions, plea bargain due to possible evidentiary
improprieties, or attend suppression hearings, prosecutors should experience a
dramatic time savings. These time savings, which, of course, translate into
monetary savings, are important because the time freed up for these agencies will
provide relief for an overburdened judicial system, one that even now struggles to
find ways to reduce its tremendous workload.
102. See id.
103. See H. Mitchell Caldwell & Carol A. Chase, The Unruly Exclusionary Rule: Heeding Justice
Blackmnun's Call to Examine the Rule in Light of Changing Judicial Understanding About Its Effects
Outside the Courtroom, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 45, 50-51 (1994).
104. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 722.
105. See id.
106. See COMPTROLLER'S REPORT, supra note 91, app.ll at 10.
107. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 753-54.
108. See id.
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4. Cost to Individual Rights
It is ironic that the rule put in place to protect individual liberties has instead
had a decidedly chilling effect on individual liberty. The rule that was to "dictate"
law enforcement compliance with the Fourth Amendment has led to the
development of a body of law that has compromised individual liberties under the
Fourth Amendment. Judges faced with the prospect of evidence exclusion, and the
specter of a gutted prosecution, have contorted the law of criminal procedure in a
result-determinative attempt to keep otherwise excludable evidence from being
excluded. This contortion of the law impacts society on a far greater level than lost
prosecutions in any particular case. The exclusionary rule has led to the
compromise of the Fourth Amendment protections for all Americans.
For example, in order to protect drug convictions, the Supreme Court has held
that a person has no expectation of privacy in his financial' ° and telephone
records " 0 because he or she has released information contained in those records to
a third party, namely, the companies which provide those services. These holdings
fly in the face of both Katz v. United States' and the reasonable assumption that
a person who banks or makes phone calls does not expect the companies through
whom he contracts these services to make information about his records public.
In Florida v. Riley, ' 2 the Supreme Court held that an individual who had
erected a greenhouse in his fenced backyard did not have a reasonable expectation
of privacy when a police helicopter hovered directly over the greenhouse and used
high-powered binoculars to observe through vent slats the marijuana plants
growing within." 3 In order to uphold the conviction of the marijuana grower, the
Court advanced the legally farcical notion that a person would not expect privacy
in such a place," 4 even though it is likely that if a private person had used high
powered binoculars and a helicopter to observe activities within that greenhouse,
he or she would have faced liability for invasion of privacy or worse." 5 These
result-determinative decisions illustrate the lengths to which courts will go to
109. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440-41 (1976).
110. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741-46 (1979).
111. 389 U.S. 347,352-53 (1967) (holding that the Fourth Amendment is violated when a warantless
search is conducted in a place where 1) a reasonable person would have an expectation of privacy and
2) the person asserting the right actually manifests an expectation of privacy).
112. 488 U.S. 445(1989).
113. See id. at 450-51.
114. See id; see, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 119 S. Ct. 469 (1998) (decision of the Supreme Court
from its current term exemplifying the arbitrary lines the Court draws in deciding who may assert a
Fourth Amendment violation; the Court decided that a mere guest in a home does not have standing to
object to the search of that home, but if the guest stays overnight, the person does have standing).
115. See Riley, 488 U.S. at 450.
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preserve the admissibility of evidence." 6 These decisions reduce the right of
privacy individuals have in places and things. The specter of the exclusionary rule
hovers over almost every judicial decision involving criminal procedure. And
because of its draconian "one rule fits all" remedy," 7 judges are not free to fairly,
dispassionately, and consistently apply the body of Fourth Amendment law.
Compromises to accommodate the needs of particular situations lead to "bad"
law."
8
Furthermore, under the current system, police searches in violation of the
Fourth Amendment that do not result in an arrest"9 do not offer any true remedy
to the person whose rights were violated.2 The police misconduct, therefore,
remains undeterred. Under the Pepperdine Proposal, an opportunity to address
these grievances will be available regardless of whether the violation led to an
116. See Carter, 119 S. Ct. at 474 (holding that a temporary guest does not have standing to
challenge a search of a home, but overnight guest does); California v. Hodari, 499 U.S. 621,629 (1991)
(refusing to suppress crack cocaine that was thrown to the ground by the defendant as he was being
chased by a police officer). The Court in Hodari held that the defendant was not seized for purposes
of the Fourth Amendment when a police officer began chasing him, even though the officer had no
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Id.; see also California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988)
(holding that a person has no expectation of privacy in trash left on theircurb for garbage-man pickup);
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987) (holding that a person had no expectation of privacy in a
barn on person's own property surrounded by two fences when officers had to come onto the property,
climb two fences, and peer over an opening with a flashlight in order to see inside the barn); California
v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1985) (holding that defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy to his backyard, which contained marijuana, even though it was part of the curtilage of his
home and defendant had built a six foot outer fence and ten foot inner fence around it; warrant was not
required for the police to fly over the defendant's yard at 1,000 feet to look around it); INS v. Delgado,
466 U.S. 210, 218-20 (1984) (holding that illegal aliens were not seized for the purposes of the Fourth
Amendment when INS agents, armed and in uniform, positioned themselves at all the exits of the
building where the aliens were working and additional INS agents, also armed and in uniform, walked
around the building questioning the aliens about their citizenship). In Delgado, the Court determined
that despite the fact that armed INS agents were standing at all of the exits a reasonable person would
feel that they were free to leave. Id.
117. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 676-77.
118. See supra notes 109-116 and accompanying text.
119. For example, the police may search a residence in violation of the Fourth Amendment in hopes
of discovering admissible evidence, then having found none, decide not to charge the individual. The
police may also illegally search one individual's residence for the purpose of securing evidence against
another individual who does not have standing to challenge the search. The police may, through their
own negligence, illegally search the wrong house. In none of these examples does the exclusionary rule
offer redress for the individual who had his rights violated.
120. Currently, an individual can file a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but often the
amount of damages an individual could recover is too small to justify the cost of filing a claim. See
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1978) (holding that plaintiffs must prove actual injury to
recover damages under § 1983); Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 739-40.
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arrest. 2' This aspect of our proposal may be easily overlooked in light of the vast
implications involved in partially eliminating the exclusionary rule. However, it
should be noted that our proposal is a significant step forward in the preservation
of individual liberties.
5. Cost to Police Integrity
"It is an open secret long shared by prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges, that
perjury is widespread among law enforcement officers.... [T]he exclusionary rule
might not have been such a good idea.... [Ilt sets up a great incentive for people
to lie.... [With the exclusionary rule] [y~ou may just get more incentive for police
to tell a lie to avoid letting somebody they think is guilty, or they know is guilty, go
fle, , 12 2free." 2
-Judge Alex Kozinski
Police perjury, perhaps more than any other consequence, cuts to the very heart
of our system of justice. 23 A police officer, by virtue of her position, is uniquely
able to pervert the administration of justice. 124 It is a small step from lying to
preserve the admissibility of evidence to lying to convict an innocent defendant. 1
25
The Skolnick study of 1966 provided empirical data of such police practices, 126 and
our study, some three decades later, provided chilling confirmation that, indeed,
police occasionally lie in order to prevent exclusion of evidence. 127 This factor, as
much as any other, presents a clear and present danger to individual rights. The
121. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 751.
122. Stuart Taylor, Jr.,For the Record, THEAMERICAN LAWYER, Oct. 1995, at 71-72 (quotingJudge
Alex Kozinski of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit).
123. More that seventy years ago, Justice Brandeis voiced his deep concern about police misconduct:
"To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means-to declare that the
Govemment may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal-would bring
terrible retribution." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
124. See Morgan Cloud, Judges, "Testilying," and the Constitution, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1341, 1352
(1996) ('"A police officer's word is a pillar of our criminal justice system. On the word of a police
officer alone a grand jury may indict, a trial jury may convict, and a judge pass sentence."') (quoting
COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE ANTI-CORRUPTION
PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT, THE CITY OF NEW YORK, COMMISSION REPORT (Milton
Mollen, Chair) (1994)) [hereinafter MOLLEN REPORT].
125. See, e.g., Parn Belluck, Officials Face Trial in Alleged Plot to Frame Man for Murder, N.Y.
TIMES, March 9, 1999, at A19 (reporting that seven prosecutors and sheriff's deputies were being tried
for perjury and obstruction of justice arising out of claims the deputies fabricated evidence to convict
an innocent man, causing the defendant to spend ten years on death row).
126. See JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC
SOCIETY 211-229 (1975).
127. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 725-27.
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question is not whether police officers lie, but to what extent. Judges,28
prosecutors, 29 commentators, 30 and police officers 3' agree that police perjury is
fostered by the exclusionary rule.
Far from preventing police misconduct, the exclusionary rule provides an
incentive for the police officer to falsify reports or testimony to cover up any
mistakes made during the course of the search. The officer knows that no personal
liability will result from covering up his violation of the criminal's rights. He is,
in effect, taking a gamble, and a very attractive one at that, for at best, if he
128. See Taylor, supra note 122, at 71-72 (quoting Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals: "[The exclusionary rule] sets up a great incentive for people to lie"); see also Myron W.
Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago
Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 98 (1992) (asserting that a majority of judges and public
defenders responding to survey believed that perjury was a main factor limiting the deterrent effect of
the exclusionary rule).
129. See, e.g., H. RICHARD UVILLAR, TEMPERED ZEAL: A COLUMBIA LAW PROFESSOR'S YEAR ON
THE STREETS WITH THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE 116 (1988) (describing, from the viewpoint of a former
prosecutor, the practice of police perjury in suppression hearings as "prevalent"); Irving Younger, The
Perjury Routine, THE NATION, May 8, 1967, at 596 (characterizing police perjury as "commonplace"
from the vantage of a one-time prosecutor); see also MOLLEN REPORT, supra note 124, at 41-42. The
Mollen Commission, which was impaneled to study police corruption in New York City, reported that
"several former and current prosecutors acknowledged-'off the record'-that perjury and falsifications
are serious problems in law enforcement." See id.
130. Two commentators in particular, Alan Dershowitz and Christopher Slobogin, have written at
length about the pervasive problem of police perjury. See ALAN M. DERSHOWIT:, REASONABLE
DOUBTS 49-64 (1996) (claiming that police perjury is common); ALAN M. DERSHOWrrZ, THE BEST
DEFENSE xxi-xxii (1983) ("Almost all police lie about whether they violated the Constitution in order
to convict guilty defendants."); Alan M. Dershowitz, The Consequences of Perjury andRelated Crimes,
1998 WL 18089897 (reprint of testimony given before the United States House of Representatives
Judiciary Committee on December 1, 1998) ("All objective reports point to a pervasive problem of
police lying, and tolerance of the lying by prosecutors and judges, all in the name of convicting the
factually guilty whose rights may have been violated and whose convictions might be endangered by
the exclusionary rule."); Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery: Investigative Lies by the
Police, 76 ORE. L. REV. 775,775-76 (1997) (claiming that some police lie "routinely and pervasively,"
including under oath to convict the guilty or frame the innocent); Christopher Slobogin, Testilying:
Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1037, 1041-48 (1996) (describing the
extensive problem of police perjury); see also Cloud, supra note 124, at 1355-56 (reporting on studies
showing that "police officers commit perjury most often to avoid suppression of evidence"); Morgan
Cloud, The Dirty Little Secret, 43 EMORY L. J. 1311, 1315 (1994) ("Police perjury occurs most
frequently when officers are testifying about searches and seizures and witness interrogations.").
131. See MOLLEN REPORT, supra note 124, at 29-30, 36, 41-42 (reporting that police officers told
the Commission that the practice of police lying in connection with gun and narcotics arrests was so
common that it was given its own label: "testilying"). The Mollen Report also quoted officers as
claiming that lying was necessary to "get a suspected criminal off the streets" and that lying to help
convict a guilty person was justified. Id.; see also Jerome H. Skoinick, Terry and Community Policing,
72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1265, 1266 (1998) (quoting the Police Commissioner of New York City as
saying: "I... agree that there's a lot more police lying than most police are willing to concede').
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commits an exclusionary rule violation and lies to cover it up, most likely his
transgression will go unpunished, and the criminal will still be convicted.
However, if the lie does not work, then the next possibility is that the evidence will
be excluded, and the criminal will walk. But even under the worst-case scenario,
in which the police officer himself is sued, he will likely suffer little or no civil
liability. And in the event that the officer is found liable for substantial damages,
the city or county will probably pay the damages for him. 132 The officer may face
administrative sanctions or, in an extremely rare instance, a perjury trial, 133 but the
likelihood of either succeeding is slim, because most perjury trials turn on a
decision of credibility between an officer and an accused criminal.
No matter how low the incidence of police lying, a remedy which encourages
police perjury to cover up mistakes is at odds with the goals of the exclusionary
rule: deterrence of police misconduct and preservation of judicial integrity. Under
the Pepperdine Proposal, an officer could be personally liable for civil penalties for
violating a suspect's rights. 134 This provides an incentive to be particularly careful
in protecting individual's rights, thus diminishing situations in which an officer
would have an incentive to lie.
Levenson pointed out in her article that the threat of personal liability could
increase, not decrease, the officer's incentive to lie about violations of individual
rights.135 We disagree for one fundamental reason. Under our proposal's good
faith exception,'3 6 the officer who commits an honest, but accidental, mistake and
violates an individual's rights faces no personal liability.'37 Indeed our proposal
expands the current good faith exception beyond Leon138 and it therefore provides
more protection for police officers.
Moreover, the criticisms about an increased risk of perjury miss an important
point. Even if a police officer's incentive to commit perjury may not be reduced
by our proposal, what is likely to be greatly diminished is the extent to which
judges, prosecutors, and others will have an incentive to "wink" at the perjury.
Under the current system, judges are discouraged from critically examining police
testimony because a finding that the officer is lying will result in the exclusion of
probative evidence concerning criminal activity. Uncritical acceptance of police
officer testimony preserves the admissibility of evidence and is unlikely to be
disturbed on appeal because appellate judges give deference to a lower court's
132. See Board of the County Comm'rs v. Brown, 117 S. Ct. 1382, 1388 (1997) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (citing to state statutes that provide for indemnification of government employees).
133. See Younger, supra note 129, at 596 ("[Ihe policeman is as likely to be indicted for perjury
by his co-worker, the prosecutor, as he is to be struck down by thunderbolts from an avenging
heaven.").
134. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 744.
135. See Levenson, supra note 9, at 881.
136. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 746.
137. See id.
138. 468 U.S. 897, 922-24 (1984) (adopting good faith doctrine for searches conducted by police
in reliance on search warrant later ruled invalid).
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assessment of witness credibility. 39 We do not suggest that all, or even most,
judges uncritically accept perjured testimony, and the extent to which this occurs
is understandably difficult to determine. But studies other than our own have
acknowledged that courts tolerate some amount of police officer perjury to avoid
suppressing evidence.'4° At a minimum, our proposal should drastically reduce any
incentive judges may have to uncritically accept police officer testimony. This will
lead to better enforcement of Fourth Amendment rights. Furthermore, as judges
and prosecutors become more willing to recognize and punish police officer
perjury, we may actually see a reduction in the number of officers who are willing
to risk a perjury conviction in order to avoid a finding that they acted in violation
of the Fourth Amendment.
B. The Efficiency of the Pepperdine Proposal Versus Other Options
Professors Fellmeth and Levenson attack the proposed administrative remedy
as being inherently inefficient. 4' Citing the GAO study, and characterizing the
inefficiency of the current system as modest, Levenson postulated that our
proposed administrative remedy would be much more cumbersome than the current
system.'42 Her analysis fails to recognize, however, that any possible inefficiencies
will not impact the criminal justice system. Given that the bulk of suppression
concerns would be funneled into the administrative agency, the criminal courts
139. See United States v. Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210, 215 (3d Cir. 1987) (reasoning that the
exclusionary rule was intended to "deter unconstitutional conduct, not perjury. In the absence of a
constitutional violation, there is no basis upon which to exclude relevant evidence.").
140. See Orfield, supra note 128, at 98; see also Comment, Effect ofMapp v. Ohio on Police Search
and Seizure Practices in Narcotics Cases, 4 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 87, 95-96 (1968) (finding that
after Mapp, police testimony of finding drugs out in the open nearly tripled); supra note 128 and
accompanying text (discussing judge's acceptance of police perjury).
141. See Fellmeth, supra note 8, at 955; Levenson, supra note 9, at 880. Fellmeth also argues that
an administrative agency outside the control of the judiciary is doomed to fail. See Fellmeth, supra note
8, at 954. With an unsubstantiated dismissal of the checks built into the proposed administrative
remedy and ignoring the ultimate oversight function that judges have on the outcome of claims,
Fellmeth attempts to portray a system in which corruption will run rampant absent complete judicial
oversight. See id. Fellmeth brings a broad constitutional argument to a narrow topic. While checks
and balances function to keep the federal government from spinning into the void, Fellmeth's criticism
fails to recognize the longstanding practice of allowing the Executive branch a great deal of latitude in
oversight of its own agencies. See id. The Justice Department has the most vigorous oversight role in
the hundreds of Executive Branch agencies, yet oversight can always be taken to the judiciary in
extreme cases. The proposed administrative remedy expressly provides for appellate review of its
decisions. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 746. State Attorneys General also will have the authority
to investigate and sanction any improprieties that might arise, at least to the extent that they oversee
administrative agencies.
142. See Levenson, supra note 9, at 881-82.
would be largely freed of their responsibilities as they relate to the oversight of
police misconduct.143 Thus, the inefficiency of the current system would be
effectively removed from the courts and placed into a separate sphere; the judicial
system now unburdened could operate at a more efficient pace.
Fellmeth opined that because claims of egregious and intentional police
misconduct will continue to be handled within the current system, the Pepperdine
Proposal failed to gain ground; the courts will still be forced to deal with
suppression motions.' However, under the Pepperdine Proposal claims of
egregious and intentional police misconduct will be the only basis for exclusion. 43
Legitimate claims based on intentional police misconduct account for only a small
percentage of suppression motions, and given the clear demarcation, illegitimate
claims will be quickly weeded out.'" Thus, any suggestion that every defendant
will simply plead such conduct in order to make his claim in the criminal courts is
meritless.
Arguments based on inefficiency concerns, especially Fellmeth's, underscore
a key point about the role of our proposal. While efficiency is certainly one of the
goals of this proposed remedy, another, and far more important goal, is the
restoration of integrity to the judicial system. 47 Efficiency is important in any
discussion of legal reform,.but it would be reckless to propose efficiency at the cost
of integrity. It is premature to criticize the efficiency of an agency which is not yet
in existence. Moreover, efficiency is tangential to our proposal. Make no mistake,
this proposal is about restoring integrity and proportionality in a system that has
given way on both grounds.
C. The Deterrent Effect of the Pepperdine Proposal
Totten argued that the proposed administrative remedy carries with it the risk
of over-deterrence of police officers.'" He evoked the image of the hamstrung
officer, afraid to execute his duties for fear of facing a civil penalty. 49 This is a
legitimate concern. However, the good faith provision in our proposal largely
insulates reasonable and well-intentioned officers from civil penalties." 0 Officers
who have acted reasonably by both obtaining proper training and by making a good
faith attempt to comport their conduct to the law will not be held liable under the
143. See Heffernan & Lovely, supra note 95, at 346 (reporting that about 70% of police errors in
their study were unwitting ones).
144. See Fellmeth, supra note 8, at 953.
145. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 743.
146. See Cloud, supra note 130, at 1313.
147. See Morgan Cloud,JudicialReview and the Exclusionary Rule, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 835,835,838
(1999) (arguing that the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule was not to deter police misconduct,
but to implement constitutional judicial review in the Fourth Amendment context).
148. See Totten et al., supra note 7, at 903
149. See id. at 907.
150. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 746.
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new proposed administrative remedy.'15 Thus, officers who act in good faith will
not have their hands tied under our proposal.'52 Conversely, those officers who
intentionally violate the rules will pay, as they should.
Our proposal shifts more of the responsibility for preserving individual rights
directly onto individual officers, and thus provides more incentive for officers to
be wary of violating those rights.15 1 The indirect sanctions under the curTent
exclusionary rule are so disconnected from officer responsibility that they are
ineffectual as a deterrent. 54 In contrast, the proposed administrative remedy
directly sanctions the officer with civil liability for his misconduct,155 yet it also
protects those officers whom society needs the most: those who are well-educated
and well-intentioned. Proper training and proper motive will always be a viable
defense under the proposed remedy, 56 and therefore, the threat that our proposal
will chill officer performance is alleviated. The only officers our proposal will
"over deter" are the officers who need greater deterrence: those who act
unreasonably.
The proposed administrative remedy encourages police agencies to provide
better training to their officers by extending civil liability to police agencies that
fail to provide adequate training to their officers.' Thus, besides providing a
remedy for those whose rights are violated by the police, the Pepperdine Proposal
also has the much-desired effect of putting better-trained, more reasonable police
officers on the streets.
D. The Nexus Between the Remedy and the Constitutional Wrong
Fellmeth argued that the remedy in the Pepperdine Proposal is too far removed
from the wrong being committed on the individual and on society.' 8 This criticism
fails to recognize the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule, to deter police
misconduct, and is puzzling in light of the extent to which the current rule fails to
achieve its goals. The current system attempts to accomplish deterrence by
excluding evidence at trial. Yet, to be effective, the officer's error and the reason
for exclusion of the evidence must be communicated to the offending officer.
Upon learning of the error and the resulting exclusion, the officer must be
151. See id. at 747.
152. See id.
153. Under our proposal, officers who violate a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights without good
faith are subject to a liquidated damage award for each violation. See id. at 749.
154. See id. at 750.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 747.
157. See id. at 748.
158. See Fellmeth, supra note 8, at 956-57.
sufficiently chagrined at his error and the evidence exclusion to be motivated to
take the steps necessary to do a better job next time around.'59 All too often one or
more of these steps does not occur. 16° It would be nearly impossible to craft a
system with a less direct sanctioning of unconstitutional conduct. The tremendous
disconnection between the violation and the "remedy" is a primary reason the Rule
is in need of reform.
Conversely, our proposal furthers the goal of deterrence by directly
sanctioning the offending officer. In addition, by allowing an aggrieved individual
a monetary remedy for violations of his Fourth Amendment rights, the Pepperdine
Proposal provides a realistic remedy for redressing violations and an incentive to
file claims. Without this incentive, direct sanctions would have little effect because
few would file claims merely to compensate society.'
61
Nevertheless, Fellmeth decries compensation to the individual victim who has
had his rights violated, and insists instead that society should be compensated. 1
62
Recognizing that the violation of individual Fourth Amendment rights cannot be
undone, a monetary remedy is a time-tested method of compensating for the
violation. While violations of basic rights injure society as a whole, to propose a
system which offers no redress to the individual who most acutely suffers the
injury is contrary to any notion of justice. The dignity of the individual deserves
true protection, even if that individual has committed a crime. Fellmeth's argument
fails to recognize that when the dignity of an individual is restored, even if it takes
monetary compensation to do so, society benefits.
E. Intentional Violations and the Preservation of Judicial Integrity
Our proposal to limit the application of the exclusionary rule to intentional
misconduct has been criticized as going both too far and not far enough and as
being inefficient and imprecise. Professor Levenson suggests that judges will have
a difficult time distinguishing between intentional and unintentional misconduct,
thus adding another level of decision-making to the process.' 63 However, our
proposal radically simplifies the suppression hearing. Under exclusionary rule
jurisprudence, courts focus initially on the existence of a violation. The critical
question is whether the police officer conducted an unlawful search or seizure,
wrongfully obtained a confession, or improperly denied a person his or her right
to counsel. A court rarely finds it necessary to inquire about the officer's state of
159. If officers feel chagrined, it is unlikely due to embarrassment over having evidence suppressed.
Studies show that police officers are rarely criticized for having evidence that they seized suppressed.
See SKOLNICK, supra note 126, at 223. In fact, officers who have their evidence suppressed often
receive sympathy from peers and supervisors rather than criticism. See id.
160. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 722-23.
161. Seeid.at751.
162. See Fellmeth, supra note 8, at 956-57.
163. See Levenson, supra note 9, at 884.
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mind at the time of the wrongful conduct.'64 The Pepperdine Proposal, on the other
hand, starts with the question of the officer's intent. It asks: Did the officer
intentionally or knowingly conduct the wrongful search? 65 Only an affirmative
answer to that question will justify application of the exclusionary rule.
The Pepperdine Proposal will ease a judge's burden of having to decide
whether an officer acted in good faith or whether a particular action violated a
defendant's rights. Instead, the court's only task will be to decide, based upon all
of the circumstances, whether the officer's misconduct was intentional. Certainly,
the court's decision will be no more burdensome than thousands of other decisions
we ask judges to make. The fact that the decision may occasionally be difficult is
no reason to avoid it, particularly if the distinction to be made is ultimately worth
the effort. Here, we believe it is. Intentional misconduct by police, unlike mere
negligent or even grossly negligent actions, poisons a criminal proceeding and
imperils the public's trust and confidence in our justice system.'6 Such
misconduct must not lead to any benefit to the state or any tacit approval by the
court.
Ironically, our proposal's focus on the intent of law enforcement officers
would actually extend application of the exclusionary rule to a new area. Since the
Supreme Court decision in Harris v. New York' 67 it has been accepted that
information obtained from a defendant in violation of Miranda could be used to
impeach the defendant, if he or she testified at trial inconsistently with the prior
statement." The Court in Harris stressed that police activity resulting in Miranda
violations was not appropriate, but that the search for the truth was more important
than excluding evidence to deter police.
69
After the Court's decision in Harris, some police departments adopted policies
that encouraged police officers to question suspects outside of Miranda, by
164. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813-14 (1996) ("Subjective intentions play no role
in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis .... [Tihe Fourth Amendment's concern with
'reasonableness' allows certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the subjective
intent.").
165. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 753-54.
166. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 258 (1983) (White, J., concurring) (citations omitted);
People v. Peevy, 953 P.2d 1212, 1228-32 (Cal. 1998) (Mosk, J., concurring), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
595 (1998).
167. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
168. See id. at 224.
169. See id.; see also Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 351 (1990) ("[The 'search for truth'
outweighs the 'speculative possibility"' that excluding statements for impeachment purposes would
deter future police misconduct in violating Miranda).
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ignoring or disregarding invocations of Miranda rights.'70 These policies arise out
of a belief that Miranda is merely a prophylactic and non-constitutional rule. 7 ' The
policies encourage officers to obtain any information possible, even if it violates
Miranda, in order to enhance their investigative work and limit the ability of
defendants to offer trial testimony at variance with their statement.'72 In People v.
Peevy,'73 the Supreme Court of California ruled that a statement obtained from a
suspect can be used to impeach, even though the officers intentionally violated
Miranda in getting the statement.
74
Our proposal, by focusing on the intent of the officers, would thwart this
analysis. Judicial integrity suffers immeasurably when courts in the criminal
justice system, including the courts of last resort, give their approval to police
activity that intentionally and as a matter of policy ignores well-accepted and
clearly stated rules. Justice Byron White, in his concurrence in Illinois v. Gates,
75
recognized the connection between preservation of judicial integrity and the
exclusion of evidence seized through intentional misconduct as follows:
I do not dismiss the idea that the integrity of the courts may be compromised when
illegally seized evidence is admitted, but I am convinced that the force of the
argument depends entirely on the type of search or seizure involved. At one
extreme, there are lawless invasions of personal privacy that shock the conscience,
and the admission of evidence so obtained must be suppressed .... Also deserving
of exclusionary treatment are searches and seizures perpetrated in intentional and
flagrant disregard of Fourth Amendment principles. But the question of exclusion
must be viewed through a different lens when a Fourth Amendment violation occurs
because the police have reasonably erred in assessing the facts ... or relied in good
170. See Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 133-38 (1998).
Weisselberg describes at some length the extent to which police departments question suspects with
little or no regard for Miranda. One particularly disturbing example is a training bulletin published by
the Califomia District Attorneys Association which encouraged officers to "continue questioning a
suspect who has invoked his or her [Miranda] rights." See id. at 133.
The bulletin stated:
Despite having been on the books for twenty-nine years, Miranda is still widely
misunderstood by cops and lawyers, and misconstrued by trial and appellate courts, who
keep treating it as a constitutional imperative, the deliberate violation of which would
be improper, unlawful, unconstitutional and poisonous to call [sic] resulting evidence.
In fact, however, the warning and waiver components of Miranda were simply a court-
created "series of recommended 'procedural safeguards' that were not themselves
protected by the Constitution."
Id. (quoting Devallis Rutledge, QUESTIONING "OUTSIDE MIRANDA," DID You KNOW... (Califomia
Dist. Attorney's Ass'n, Sacramento, Cal.), June 1995 at 4).
171. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 445-46 (1974) (referring to Miranda requirements as
"prophylactic standards"); see also Weisselberg, supra note 170, at 133-35 (quoting police training
material referring to Miranda as not constitutionally required).
172. See Videotape: Questioning "Outside Miranda" (Greg Gulen Productions 1990).
173. 953 P.2d 1212 (Cal. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 595 (1998).
174. See id. at 1219 ("[Tlhe Harris rule applies even if the individual police officer violates Miranda
and Edwards by purposefully failing to honor a suspect's invocation of his or her right to counsel.").
175. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
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faith upon a warrant .... In these circumstances, the integrity of the courts is not
implicated.
176
Similarly, in the Peevy case, Justice Mosk concurred in the court's judgment
but wrote separately to caution courts about the importance of rejecting evidence
obtained by police who intentionally violate Miranda or other protective
safeguards. 177 He noted that the very existence of a law enforcement agency policy
to obtain statements from suspects in violation of Miranda would prove that
Miranda had failed to deter police misconduct and would necessarily require the
exclusion of such evidence.'78 To admit such evidence, he concluded, "would
exact a great cost from Miranda, and ultimately from the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination itself."'
79
James McNally and James Bey claimed that officers of the Los Angeles and
Santa Monica Police Departments continued questioning them after the two
suspects invoked their Miranda rights. Allegedly, the officers told McNally and
Bey that nothing they said could be used against them. 8 Of course, this statement
was false under Harris and its progeny. Ultimately, both McNally and Bey were
convicted. 8' They subsequently sued the LAPD and SMPD and asserted claims
under section 1983, claiming that the officers' interrogations violated their Fifth,
Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.' 82 The trial court denied the defendants'
Motions to Dismiss'83 and Motions for Summary Judgment and the case is
currently on appeal to the Ninth Circuit.'84
Discovery in that case revealed that the police departments trained their
officers to ignore invocations of Miranda and to continue questioning suspects.'85
Our proposal would require courts to examine the officer's intent and would
require exclusion of this evidence, even for impeachment purposes, if the Miranda
violations were knowing and intentional.
176. See id. at 259 n. 14 (White, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
177. See Peevy, 953 P.2d at 1228 (Mosk, J., concurring).
178. See id. at 1231-32.
179. Id. at 1232.
180. See California Attorneys for Criminal Justice v. Butts, 922 F. Supp. 327, 329-30 (C.D. Cal.
1996).
181. See id. at 330.
182. See id.
183. See id. at 338.
184. See Jenna Ward, Do Police Have the Right Not to Live By "Miranda", RECORDER, Sept. 17,
1998, at I (reporting that the federal district judge denied the defendants' Motions for Summary
Judgment in August of 1997 and that the court's ruling is currently on appeal to the Ninth Circuit).
185. See Weisselberg, supra note 170, at 133 (observing that the Butts "litigation uncovered training
materials for law enforcement officials, teaching officers that it is permissible to question suspects who
have invoked the right to counsel or the right to remain silent.").
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One might argue that such an extension of Miranda would actually impugn
judicial integrity. It would create the likelihood of criminal defendants offering
perjured testimony at trial, secure in the knowledge that the prosecution could do
nothing about it.1 6  Yet, when police manipulate this loophole to justify
disregarding a suspect's Miranda rights, the integrity of the entire criminal justice
system suffers.'87 Miranda provides no protection for suspects if the police feel
free to ignore its invocation to gain an advantage. We believe that preserving the
system's integrity requires excluding evidence under such circumstances, even if
that means risking an increase in perjured testimony by defendants. Our hope is
that such an approach will cause police to exhibit greater respect for the rights of
suspects, and thus, restore greater confidence in our system of justice. Thus,
contrary to Levenson's criticisms, 8 8 our use of the intentional and knowing
standard actually extends the exclusionary rule to new areas and properly focuses
the attention of courts to the egregiousness of police conduct while preserving
judicial integrity.
Unlike Levenson, Professor Fellmeth criticizes the intentional and knowing
standard because it does not go far enough.8 9 Our concern about Fellmeth's
radical approach is two-fold: first, he fails to provide any means for preserving
judicial integrity in the absence of some use of the exclusionary rule; and second,
his proposed replacement remedy"9 is facially inadequate to protect the rights of
injured suspects or to compensate for their injury. The retention of the
exclusionary rule for instances of intentional police misconduct in combination
with the proposal civil administrative remedy effectively addresses both of these
concerns.
IV. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROPOSAL: THE STATES AS
LABORATORIES
We believe that the civil administrative remedy is a logical, rational, and
sensible solution to a perplexing problem. But this question remains: is it a usable
solution that could be implemented by state and federal legislatures? Professor
Harold Krent attempts to answer that question in his imminently practical article,' 9'
which fills a gap left by our initial offering. Krent concludes that the proposal
could be implemented consistent with Supreme Court authority, and that any
186. See Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 351 (1990) (noting high importance of truthful
testimony in trials and need for safeguards to ensure truthfulness of witnesses); Harris v. New York, 401
U.S. 222, 224 (1971) (allowing prosecutors to impeach a defendant for credibility purposes by using
the defendant's prior conflicting statements).
187. See generally Weisselberg, supra note 170, at 109.
188. See Levenson, supra note 9, at 879.
189. See Fellmeth, supra note 8, at 953.
190. See id. at 960-61.
191. See Harold J. Krent, How to Move Beyond the Exclusionary Rule: Structuring Judicial
Response to Legislative Reform Efforts, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 885 (1999).
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resulting "lack of uniformity should be accepted as the price we pay for our system
of federalism."'"
We agree with Professor Krent and offer a few additional thoughts about the
implementation of our proposal. Initially, we note that the Supreme Court has the
final word on matters of constitutional law or interpretation.' 93 The Court has made
it clear, however, that the exclusionary rule is simply a "judicially created means
of deterring illegal searches and seizures" and other police misconduct.1 94 The
exclusionary rule is not a personal constitutional right.' 95 Although the Court's
opinion in Mapp left some doubt about the basis for the exclusionary rule,1
96
subsequent decisions have been remarkably unambiguous. The Court, in
Calandra,9 7 Stone,"8 and Scott,"9 characterized the exclusionary rule as a
judicially created remedy, not a personal constitutional right. Moreover, individual
justices have on occasion demonstrated their beliefs about the nature of the
exclusionary rule by soliciting or suggesting other means of enforcing Fourth
192. See id. at 875.
193. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 173-175 (1803).
194. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 118 S. Ct. 2014, 2019 (1998) (noting that the
exclusionary rule is a "judicially created means of deterring illegal searches and seizures") (citations
omitted); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976) (indicating that the exclusionary rule is not a
personal constitutional right); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) ("[Tlhe
[exclusionary] rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights
generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party
aggrieved.").
195. See Stone, 428 U.S. at 486; Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348. Professor Morgan Cloud, in his
symposium contribution, argues that we have made an important mistake in assuming that "the primary,
and perhaps sole, justification for the exclusionary rule is deterring police misconduct." See Cloud,
supra note 147, at 835. His criticism demonstrates that "one man's assumptions are another man's
facts." We agree that judicial integrity was an important part of the Court's rationale in adopting the
exclusionary rule. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 672-73, 753. Yet, it is equally clear, and
unfortunate, that the Court has ignored the judicial integrity rationale and emphasized the deterrence
rationale as the primary, if not sole, justification for the Rule. Scott, Stone, and Calandra all point to
that undeniable fact. See Scott, 118 S. Ct. at 2019; Stone, 428 U.S. at 486; Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348.
Professor Cloud criticizes these decisions, but he cannot magically wish them away. Moreover, our
proposal seeks to recognize the important role of judicial integrity in instances of intentional police
misconduct. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 753.
196. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,649 (1961). In Mapp, the Court made conflicting statements
about the basis for the Rule. At one point it said: "the plain and unequivocal language of Weeks--and
its later paraphrase in Wolf--to the effect that the Weeks rule is of constitutional origin, remains entirely
undisturbed." Id. But elsewhere in the opinion it downplayed the Rule's consitiutional basis calling
it a "judicially implied deterrent safeguard." Professor Krent notes in his article that in Mapp "the
Court's plurality opinion equivocated as to the nature of the exclusionary rule." Krent, supra note 191,
at 860.
197. 414 U.S. at 348.
198. 428 U.S. at 486.
199. 118 S. Ct. at 2019.
Amendment rights."° The distinction between right and remedy is critically
important. As Krent points out, "when the Court formulates constitutional law in
a common-law capacity, other actors may play a more direct role in constitutional
lawmaking."20'
In our context, those other actors would be state or federal legislatures. Our
proposal, which includes the creation of a new jadministrative agency, would
require a legislative enactment. But would the Supreme Court give its imprimatur
to our proposal, allowing Congress or individual states to replace the exclusionary
rule in instances of unintentional violations with a civil administrative remedy?
The answer to that question turns on the Rule's remedial purpose, which is to
deter illegal searches and seizures."e Presumably, any alternative remedy must
provide comparable deterrence to comport with the Constitution. The Court has
refused to apply the exclusionary rule when application of the rule would fail to
deter police misconduct. 20 3 At the same time, the Court has rejected application of
the rule to a variety of nontrial contexts, including grand juries, 2°4 habeas corpus,205
civil tax,2 06 civil deportation, 2c and parole revocation hearings .2 m Violations of
rights of persons not charged with a crime cannot be deterred by a rule which
applies only in a criminal proceeding. The Pepperdine Proposal, on the other hand,
will apply to all police misconduct and impose direct consequences on the police
officer who violates an individual's rights.2 9 Therefore, the administrative remedy,
in combination with retention of the exclusionary rule for intentional misconduct
by police, will deter police misconduct more effectively than does the exclusionary
200. See United States v. Leon, 486 U.S. 897,928 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 421 (1971) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting). Justice Blackmun's words in Leon have provided a kind of clarion call for the authors,
prodding them to search for an effective alternative to the exclusionary rule. We have quoted
Blackmnun's words in prior exclusionary rule articles. See Caldwell & Chase, supra note 103, at 45
(looking for alternatives to the exclusionary rule); L. Timothy Perrin, et al., An Invitation to Dialogue:
Exploring the Pepperdine Proposal to Move Beyond the Exclusionary Rule, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 789,789
n.1 (1999). In Bivens, Chief Justice Burger's dissent urged congressional action to replace the
exclusionary rule. He stated: "I conclude... that an entirely different remedy is necessary but it is one
that in my view is as much beyond judicial power as the step the Court takes today. Congress should
develop an administrative or quasi-judicial remedy against the government itself to afford compensation
and restitution for persons whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated." Bivens, 403 U.S. at
422.
201. Krent, supra note 191, at 858.
202. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
203. See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 16 (1995) (extending good faith exception to clerical errors
by court employees); Massachusetts v. Shepard, 468 U.S. 981,988-91 (1984) (applying the good faith
doctrine to judicial error in issuing a warrant); Leon, 468 U.S. at 922-24 (adopting a good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule when police rely on a warrant later ruled invalid.)
204. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974).
205. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976).
206. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433,454 (1976).
207. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1034 (1984).
208. See Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 118 S. Ct. 2014, 2022 (1998).
209. Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 750-51.
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rule.
Our proposal adds protection for police by extending the current good faith
doctrine to all conduct by police officers."' However, the proposal simultaneously
broadens potential civil liability for all unreasonable misconduct engaged in by
police officers, including liquidated damages for each violation and easy access for
each complainant.21 The strident opposition of Totten and his co-authors to the
proposal and their concern that the proposal would over deter police2. 2 demonstrate
the proposal's strong deterrent effect. Moreover, the fact that fewer than five
percent of the law enforcement officers who responded to our study agreed that the
exclusionary rule should be replaced with a monetary recovery for victims suggests
that the proposal will produce a consequence more likely to deter police.2"3
Krent's conclusion that the Supreme Court would defer to state or federal
legislatures enacting our proposal gains support from a recent Fourth Circuit
decision concerning Miranda rights. In United States v. Dickerson"4 the appellate
court held that the admissibility of confessions is controlled by an often ignored
federal statute2"5 rather than the Supreme Court's holding in Miranda."6 Congress
passed the statute in 1968,217 only two years after Miranda.21 The statute purports
to make voluntariness the sole test for admitting confessions in federal court.2 1 9
The Fourth Circuit rested its opinion on the principle that Congress can override
judicially created rules of evidence and procedure that are not constitutionally
required and concluded that Miranda is not a constitutionally mandated rule.22°
Thus, the statute was a legitimate exercise of congressional authority.
22
'
In the same way Miranda was created by the Supreme Court as a means of
enforcing Fifth Amendment rights, so is the exclusionary rule a court created rule
of enforcement. In the same way Congress chose to override the Court's creation
210. See id. at 746-47.
211. See id. at 750-51.
212. See Totten et al., supra note 7, at 894.
213. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 732, 744 tbl.7.
214. 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999).
215. See 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (1994). The statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows: "[A]
confession... shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given." Id.
216. See Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 671.
217. See 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a).
218. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
219. See 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a).
220. See Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 690-91. The Fourth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court has not
referred to the Miranda warnings as a constitutional right, but has invited Congress and the states to
develop their own safeguards. See id. at 691. The court concluded that the plain language of the statute
reflected its intention to overrule Miranda and restore voluntariness as the sole test for the admission
of confessions. See id. at 686-87.
221. See id. at 692.
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in Miranda, it could also choose to modify or completely override the exclusionary
rule. Even if the Supreme Court ultimately decides that the statute's voluntariness
test does not adequately replace the important protective function served by
Miranda,"' our proposal, with its more direct and comprehensive deterrence of
police misconduct than the exclusionary rule, actually strengthens the protective
function of the Rule.
Within the framework of the Constitution, Congress could enact our proposal
to partially replace the exclusionary rule with a civil administrative remedy.
Congressional legislation would be the most effective means of implementing the
proposal and ensuring that the goals intended by the exclusionary rule, deterrence
and judicial integrity, are uniformly met. Indeed, only an act of Congress would
provide the possibility of national uniformity in redressing police misconduct under
the Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth Amendment. Through appropriate legislation Congress
could put into place the agency to administer the civil administrative remedy, and
could either mandate state participation in the new scheme using its power to
protect individual rights under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment, 223 or
encourage such participation using its spending powers under Article I, Section 8
of the Constitution.224 Congress already uses those powers to regulate a broad
array of activities that are non-federal. Congress has relied on its enforcement
powers under the Fourteenth Amendment to enact legislation such as the Civil
Rights Act of 1964225 and subsequent anti-discrimination laws that prohibit
discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, age, and disability (among
others).22 6 Furthermore, Congress has relied on its spending powers to encourage
states to enact into law a variety of provisions, including legislation raising the
legal drinking age to twenty-one.227
222. The Fourth Circuit's decision may be susceptible to challenge on procedural grounds. Despite
the fact that neither the prosecution nor the defense raised the statute in the lower court proceedings,
the Foruth Circuit considered the statute anyway. The court did so on the suggestion of an amicus, a
law professor, Paul Cassell. See id.
223. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. Under the incorporation doctrine, the Fourth, Fifth, and
Sixth Amendments apply to the states through the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. See
JEROLD H. ISRAEL ETAL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND THE CONSTITUTION 43-44 (1997) (discussing the
Supreme Court's incorporation of the protections contained in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments, beginning with Mapp v. Ohio). Thus, the rights protected by the exclusionary rule apply
to the states with equal force and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment empowers Congress to
enforce those rights. Section 5 provides as follows: "The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 5.
224. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The Spending Clause provides that Congress is empowered
to "lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States." See id.
225. See 42 U.S.C.A. § § 2000A-2000h-6 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
226. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § § 621-634 (1994) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act); 42 U.S.C.
§ § 12101-1247 (Americans With Disabilities Act).
227. See 23 U.S.C. § 158 (1990); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1987). In Dole, the
Supreme Court identified four restrictions on Congress' broad spending powers: (1) the expenditure
must be "intended to serve general public purposes"; (2) any conditions on the receipt of funds by the
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Even if Congress does not legislate the proposal into existence, individual
states could implement the proposal. The resulting lack of uniformity should not
pose any constitutional impediment to states that choose to enact the proposal. At
least nine states have not adopted the good faith doctrine formulated in Leon.
228
Another state has created a good faith exception for arrests2 29 and the knock and
notice requirement,"3 and other states do not apply the exclusionary rule to
evidence obtained by police as a result of arrests made with probable cause but in
violation of state law.231
Beyond Fourth Amendment issues, matters of great importance are regularly
left to the states to decide for themselves, provided they do so within the
framework of the Constitution. The diversity of state law governing issues such
as abortion, 232 physician-assisted suicide, 233 and the use of marijuana for medical
states must be unambiguous; (3) any condition placed on receipt of federal funds must be related to the
federal interest in particular national projects or programs; and (4) other consitutional provisions must
not bar the conditional grant of funds. See id. at 207-08. The Court held that it was a constitutional
exercise of Congressional spending powers to require that states raise the legal drinking age to 21 before
they could receive a certain percentage of federal highway funds otherwise allocable to the states. Id.
at 205. The Court stated: "Even if Congress might lack the power to impose a national minimum
drinking age directly, we conclude that encouragement of state action found in [the pertinent statute]
is a valid use of the spending power." Id. at 212. Other examples of Congress using its spending
powers to "encourage" states to enact leglislation deemed to be in the national interest abound. See,
e.g., 23 U.S.C. § 159(a) (Supp. 1998) (requiring Secretary ofTransportation to withhold highway funds
from states unless they enacted and enforced laws requiring the suspension or revocation of the driver's
license of each individual convicted of a drug offense); id. § 161 (requiring withholding of state funds
in absence of legislation "that considers an individual under the age of 21 who has a blood alcohol
concentration of 0.02 percent or greater while operating a motor vehicle in the State to be driving while
intoxicated").
228. See State v. Marsala, 579 A.2d 58, 59 (Conn. 1990); Gary v. State, 422 S.E.2d 426, 428 (Ga.
1992); State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 671 (Idaho 1992); Commonwealth v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d 548,
556 (Mass. 1985); State v. Canelo, 653 A.2d 1097, 1102 (N.H. 1995); State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d
820, 822-23 (N.J. 1987); People v. Bigelow, 488 N.E.2d 451, 455 (N.Y. 1985); State v. Carter, 370
S.E.2d 553, 554 (N.C. 1988); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 888 (Pa. 1991).
229. See Harvey v. State, 469 S.E.2d 176, 178-79 (Ga. 1996).
230. See Neal v. State, 325 S.E.2d 457, 459 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984).
231. See People v. Burdo, 223 N.W.2d 358,360 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974) ("[Because] probable cause
did exist, defendant's arrest was not constitutionally invalid, but rather merely statutorily illegal;
therefore the per se exclusionary rule is not applicable."); State v. Eubanks, 196 S.E. 2d 706,709(1973)
(exclusionary rule does not apply to arrest that was statutorily illegal, but constitutionally valid).
232. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) (holding that "[olnly where state
regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman's ability to make [the abortion] decision does the
power of the State reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause"). The undue
burden test adopted in Casey has resulted in the enactment of a variety of abortion regulations by states,
including, among others, waiting periods, parental consent, and informed consent requirements. See
id. at 881-87, 899-900 (upholding constitutionality of Pennsylvania's informed consent, waiting period
provisions, and parental consent requirements); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.412 (West 1998)
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purposes 34 reflects the power of states in a federalist society to retain all authority
not explicitly divested by the federal government.235 The Supreme Court has
repeatedly described the relationship between the federal government and the states
as one in which "a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest
of the country." '236
States are free to propose laws and create rights or remedies provided they do
not conflict with the federal Constitution. The exclusionary rule is not
constitutionally mandated, thus clearing the way for implementation of our
proposed civil administrative remedy. Any resulting lack of uniformity should be
welcomed, not feared, as we move toward a stronger, more effective criminal
(providing that abortions may be performed before viability with consent of patient and after viability
if necessary to preserve the life or health of the patient); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-72-18.2.74 (Michie
1996) (providing for lawful abortions during the first two trimesters of pregnancy, but prohibiting
abortion during the third trimester unless "continuation of the pregnancy is likely to result in the death
of the woman" or substantial physical or emotional injury); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-74.2 (Michie Supp.
1998) (prohibiting "partial birth abortion that is not necessary to save the life of a mother"); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 18.2-76 (Michie Supp. 1998) (requiring informed consent before all abortions).
233. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAw § 120.30 (McKinney 1997) (providing that physician-assisted
suicide is a felony crime); Death With Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. § 127.810-897 (1997) (providing
that terminally ill adults residing in Oregon may obtain a lethal prescription from an Oregon physician);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060 (West 1988) (providing that physician-assisted suicide is a felony
crime). The New York and Washington statutes were recently upheld by the Supreme Court. See
generally Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (upholding Washington statute that
prohibited physician assisted suicide); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997); Robert M. Hardaway et
al., The Right to Die and the Ninth Amendment: Compassion and Dying After Glucksberg and Vacco,
7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 313 (1999) (discussing the right to die under a Ninth Amendment analysis).
234. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West Supp. 1999) (providing that the state
cannot impose civil or criminal penalties on a patient with an illness for which marijuana provides relief
if such patient is found in possession of or growing marijuana for personal use); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,
§ 780-104 (West 1993 & Supp. 1998) (making no allowance for the medical use of marijuana); TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 48 1.111 (c), 481.201-205 (West 1992) (creating a research program
through the Texas Board of Health to allow the controlled use of marijuana for medicinal purposes).
235. See THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 203 (Alexander Hamilton) (Issac Kramnick, ed. 1987)
(commenting that "the rule that all authorities, of which the states are not explicitly divested in favor
of the Union, remain with them in full vigor is not only a theoretical consequence of that division, but
is clearly admitted by the whole tenor of [the Constitution]").
236. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Brandeis described the role of states as "one of the happy incidents of the federal system." See id. In
the time since Liebman, the Court has regularly invoked Brandeis' words. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50 (1973) (quoting Brandeis' dissent in Liebman); Arizona v.
Evans, 514 U.S. 1. 30 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Brandeis' dissent in Liebman in
exclusionary rule case and concluding: "this Court should select a jurisdictional presumption that
encourages States to explore different means to secure respect for individual rights in modem times");
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,600 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Brandeis' dissent
in Liebman and noting the Court's failure to allow Virginia to reintroduce the novel disposition of
single sex education); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (noting that when there is
"considerable disagreement" about how to accomplish a goal, "the theory and utility of our federalism
is revealed for the states may perform their role as laboratories for experimentation to devise various
solutions").
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justice system.
V. APPLICATION OF THE PEPPERDINE PROPOSAL
Our proposal to move beyond reliance on the exclusionary rule as the primary
remedy for police misconduct has raised a number of valid and practical concerns
on the part of academics and practitioners alike. Will the proposal work? Is it too
costly? Does it shift the balance too far for or against effective law enforcement?'
And, perhaps most importantly, what would the proposal look like in actual cases?
This section will attempt to move our proposal beyond the theoretical law review
world and into the practical world of police and law enforcement.
We utilize the facts from five exclusionary rule cases and one police search
that did not lead to a prosecution to demonstrate the critical differences between
our proposal and current practice. To provide a comprehensive overview of our
proposal the selected cases involve varying degrees of police misconduct, from the
officer acting in good faith to the officer intentionally violating the rights of
suspects. We hope to demonstrate that our civil administrative remedy will
effectively deter police misconduct,23 provide an incentive for victims to hold
police accountable for Fourth Amendment violations, 38 increase judicial
efficiency,239 make the remedy for a constitutional violation proportionate to the
misconduct,2" and eliminate the high societal cost associated with the exclusionary
rule.2
41
A. Intentional Violations: Mapp v. Ohio
On May 23, 1957,242 three Cleveland police officers went to the home of
Dollree Mapp on the mistaken belief that a suspect in a recent bombing and
paraphernalia related to the bombing were inside her house.243 Mapp would not let
them in without a warrant. 2" Three hours later, unaware that they were about to
make history, seven officers returned to Mapp's house and knocked the door down
to get inside.245 Mapp's attorney arrived just after the officers, but was not allowed
237. See Per'in et al., supra note 3, at 750-51.
238. See id. at 751.
239. See id. at 751-52.
240. See id. at 752.
241. See id. at 752-53.
242. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 644 (1961).
243. See id. at 644.
244. See id.
245. See id.
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to see his client. 2 6 Mapp demanded to see a search warrant. 24 7 When an officer
held up a piece of paper he falsely claimed was a warrant, Mapp grabbed it and a
struggle ensued.2" Mapp was handcuffed and dragged up a flight of stairs to'her
bedroom.249 Police then searched her dresser, a chest of drawers, her closet, her
daughter's bedroom, the kitchen, and her basement.250 During that search, officers
found books and pictures that led to Mapp's conviction for the violationlof an Ohio
obscenity statute.25' The Supreme Court reversed Mapp's conviction and applied
the exclusionary rule to the states, resulting in the dismissal of charges.252
Applying the Pepperdine Proposal to these facts, Mapp would again file a
motion to suppress the books and photographs.253 She would ithen have the burden
of proof to make a prima facie case that her rights were knowingly and
intentionally violated.25 4 Only after Mapp had made such a showing would the
state be required to respond to the motion.255
Assuming she made the required showing, an evidentiary hearing would follow
in which the burden would shift to the state to show that the officers did not
knowingly and intentionally violate Mapp's rights.256 The presiding judge would
not need to determine at this point whether the officers acted in good faith.257 If the
officers violated her rights knowingly and intentionally, the evidence must be
suppressed. 25" However, if the court finds that the officers did not violate Mapp's
rights knowingly and intentionally, the evidence would be admissible.
259
In Mapp the officers held up a fake warrant, arrested Mapp when she tried to
grab it, and searched her entire house without a warrant. The egregious nature of
the police misconduct demonstrates a knowing and intentional violation of Mapp's
Fourth Amendment rights, and the trial court should apply the exclusionary rule to
suppress any evidence seized from Mapp's house. 2' Thus, in the criminal
proceeding, the end result produced by the civil administrative remedy would be
no different for Mapp than under the current exclusionary rule application.
However, under current practice, the exclusionary rule is Mapp's primary
246. See id.
247. See id.
248. See id.
249. See id. at 644-45.
250. See id. at 645.
251. See id. at 644-45. The statute, § 2905.34 of the Ohio Revised Code, made it a felony to possess
obscene, lewd, or lascivious books or pictures. See id. at 643.
252. See id. at 660.
253. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 744-46.
254. See id.
255. See id.
256. See id. at 744-47.
257. See id.
258. See id. at 746-47.
259. See id.
260. See id.
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remedy and existing civil remedies are relatively ineffectual.261 Under our
proposal, the judge in the criminal proceeding would advise Mapp of the available
civil administrative remedy, including damages for any violations of her rights by
the police.262 Mapp would begin the process by filing a written verified complaint
with the agency responsible for enforcing this remedy.2 63 She would file her claim
against the officers who engaged in the wrongful conduct and against the Cleveland
Police Department if its customs or policies played a part in the police misconduct.
The statute of limitations on such a claim would be one year from the violation. 264
However, the statute would be tolled during an ongoing criminal proceeding, to
allow resolution of the matter even if the motion to suppress was denied and the
case proceeded to trial.265
Because the trial judge held that a knowing and intentional constitutional
violation had occurred, the only issue in the administrative proceeding would be
damages. 26 Any ruling made by a criminal trial judge regarding whether a
knowing and intentional violation had occurred, subject to reconsideration or
appeal, would be binding on the administrative court.267 Mapp would be entitled
to recover both compensatory and punitive damages.2" Punitive damages, limited
by a cap,2  would be recoverable in the administrative proceeding only for
knowing and intentional violations, thus providing the strongest possible deterrent
of egregious police misconduct.
27 °
Finally, the administrative law judge would be authorized to enter cease and
desist orders against the individual officers or the Cleveland Police Department
after a determination that they engaged in a policy or pattern of illegal conduct.2 1
The judge would also have the authority to enforce these orders through contempt
power and to sanction anyone who violated the order.27 2 Thus, under our prop'osal,
with respect to knowing and intentional violations by police, victims such as Mapp
would receive the benefits of the exclusionary rule in addition to receiving
compensatory and punitive damages.
261. See id. at 737-40 (describing significant limitations of existing civil remedies).
262. See id. at 754.
263. See id. at 745.
264. See id. at 747-48.
265. See id.
266. See id. at 747, 754.
267. See id.
268. See id. at 748-49.
269. See id. at 749.
270. See id. at 748-749.
271. See id.
272. See id. at 749-50.
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B. Unintentional Violations: United States v. Reilly
Kevin Reilly owned a 10.71 acre farm in New York, which he used to grow
marijuana. 3 Two New York police officers discovered Reilly's illegal activities
and entered his property in 1991 without a warrant." 4 They stumbled across
approximately twenty marijuana plants growing in a wooded area located about 125
feet from a cottage .17  The officers then left the property, obtained a search
warrant, and returned to Reilly's property to seize the marijuana plants and
marijuana paraphernalia.276
Although a warrant was issued, the officers failed to inform the magistrate of
their previous warrantless search of the property one year earlier. The officers
further failed to inform the judge that they had actually entered the property to find
the marijuana, and omitted many characteristics of the property, providing only a
bare bones description of the property.277  In subsequent federal court
proceedings, 278 the district judge279 and Second Circuit rejected the officers' good
faith claims.28 The Second Circuit noted that "[tihe good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule does not protect searches by officers who fail to provide all
potentially adverse information to the issuing judge. 28' In seeking the warrant, the
officers omitted information that was clearly material to the legality of the search,
particularly relating to the issue of curtilage. The Second Circuit found that the
marijuana plants were within the property's curtilage,282 which the trial judge
273. United States v. Reilly, 76 F.3d 1271, 1273 (2d Cir. 1996).
274. See id. at 1273.
275. See id. The farm consisted of a main residence and a cottage about 375 feet away. See id.
Reilly planted a lawn throughout the property and hundreds of trees. See id. He also put in a pond and
gazebo by the cottage. See id. The property was fenced in on three sides and had a hedgerow and trees
along one border. See id. The Second Circuit described the property as "well-maintained and
pastoral." See id. at 1273-74.
276. See id. at 1274. The officers found fifteen plants in the cottage and about 115 growing in the
wooded area. See id. In Reilly's residence they seized one plant, some harvested marijuana, and
implements for weighing and bagging. See id.
277. See id. at 1280. The search warrant was issued on the basis of the affidavit of one of the
officers. See id. The officer stated in the affidavit that he "walked along Reilly's property until [he]
found an area where marijuana plants were grown" but failed to describe the area in any detail. See id.
278. Reilly was first prosecuted in state court, wherein he pled guilty to criminal possession of
marijuana and unlicensed growing of marijuana. See id. at 1274. He challenged the search on appeal,
however, and the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court found that the search of Reilly's
property was illegal under New York's open fields doctrine. See id. He was then indicted in federal
court and charged with manufacture of marijuana. See id.
279. See United States v. Reilly, 875 F. Supp. 108, 121 (N.D.N.Y. 1994), affd, 76 F.3d 1271, 1283
(2d Cir. 1996) (holding that the search was an illegal invasion of Reilly's curtilage).
280. See Reilly, 76 F.3d at 1283.
281. Id. at 1280.
282. See id. at 1281. The Second Circuit concluded: "[T]hough the boundaries of curtilage are
naturally and necessarily imprecise, the officers undertook a search that caused them to invade what
they could not fail to have known was potentially Reilly's curtilage. They then failed to provide Judge
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would have known before issuing the warrant if he had been given sufficient
information about the property by the officers. 283 Moreover, the issuance of the
warrant was premised on information obtained from the illegal prior search made
earlier the same day.28 4
Under our proposal, the issue for the trial judge would not be whether the
officers acted in good faith, but whether the officers' misconduct was knowing and
intentional.285 The prosecution would argue that the officers did in fact obtain a
search warrant, rather than seizing the marijuana at the time of their initial
discovery. The prosecution would further argue that the officers were reasonably
under the mistaken belief that the marijuana plants were not within the curtilage of
the property in that they were more than 200 feet from the residence.286 The
Second Circuit recognized in its opinion the difficulty officers face in determining
the parameters of curtilage.287 Thus, their conduct may have been negligent or
grossly negligent, but it did not rise to the level of knowing and intentional. The
defendant would simply reiterate the successful arguments made to the Second
Circuit-that the description of the defendant's farm was calculated to mislead
288
and that the officers' prior search of the farm was illegal.289
We believe that the facts in Reilly exemplify police misconduct that falls short
of the knowing and intentional standard, but also falls outside of the good faith
exemption. Thus, under our proposal the court would admit the evidence at trial,
contrary to the actual result in the Reilly case. However, Reilly would have access
to the civil administrative remedy to recover damages for the unreasonable police
misconduct of wrongfully searching his property.29 It is this situation, involving
police misconduct that falls between the good faith and intentional extremes, 9 l in
Barrett with an account of what they did." Id.
283. See id. at 1280. The Second Circuit noted that without a more detailed description of the land
"the issuing judge could not possibly make a valid assessment of the legality of the warrant that he was
asked to issue." Id.
284. See id. "[The officers never gave Judge Barrett a full account of what they did. And without
such an account, Judge Barrett could not possibly decide whether their conduct was sufficiently illegal
and in bad faith as to preclude a valid warrant." Id.
285. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 743.
286. The Second Circuit noted the imprecise nature of the curtilage analysis and recognized that
"[t]he distance between the marijuana plants and the main residence.., is admittedly large." Reilly,
76 F.3d at 1277.
287. See id.
288. See id. at 1280.
289. See id.
290. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 744-53 (discussing the civil administrative remedy process).
291. For another example of this level of misconduct see United States v. De Leon-Reyna, 898 F.2d
486 (5th Cir. 1990). In that case, a Boarder Patrol Agent stopped a welding truck based on erroneous
information about the truck's license plate registration. See id. at 487. The officer obtained the
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which our proposal has the most significant impact on current practice. Rather than
obtaining a windfall from the exclusionary rule and having his charges dismissed
because of police errors, Reilly would be iprosecuted, and likely convicted, for
illegally growing marijuana.292 At the same time, he would have relatively easy
access to the administrative remedy, including counsel provided by the agency
itself, and the right to recover damages for the constitutional wrong he suffered.293
At a minimum, Reilly would be entitled to liquidated damages for each wrong
committed by the police, regardless of his actual economic or non-economic
damages.
C. Violations Made in Good Faith: United States v. Leon
In August of 1981, a confidential informant of unproven reliability told
Burbank Police officers that two persons he knew as Armando and Patsy were
selling cocaine and methaqualone from their home.294 The informant apparently
witnessed Patsy sell methaqualone five months earlier and saw her in possession
of a large amount of cash.295 The informant also indicated that Armando and Patsy
kept only small amounts of the drugs at their home and stored larger quantities
elsewhere. 2' On the basis of this information, officers began an investigation of
the residence identified by the informant and two others as well.297
During the investigation, officers learned of Albert Leon's involvement 29 and
of his prior arrest on drug charges. 29 Another informant stated that Leon was
heavily involved in drug importation."° Officers observed numerous instances of
what they believed to be drug transactions at the residence identified by the first
informant and at two other residences, one of which was Leon's residence.' On
the basis of these and other observations, 30 2 an "experienced and well-trained
erroneous information because he failed to use code words in communicating the license plate number,
contrary to agency policy, resulting in the dispatcher misunderstanding the license plate of the truck.
See id. at 488. After the wrongful stop, the agent discovered twelve hundred pounds of cocaine in the
truck. See id. The Fifth Circuit found that the agent "was negligent for failing to follow proper radio
procedures," and thus, there was no proper basis for the initial stop. See id. Under our proposal, the
drugs would be admissible at trial because the agent's misconduct was unintentional. See Perrin et al.,
supra note 3, at 743.
292. Reilly initially pled guilty to the state court charges. See Reilly, 76 F.3d at 1274.
293. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 745, 749.
294. United States v. Leon, 568 U.S. 897, 901 (1984).
295. See id.
296. See id.
297. See id.
298. See id. at 901-02.
299. See id.
300. See id. at 901.
301. See id. at 901-02.
302. See id. Officers also observed two other men whom officers believed were involved board
separate flights to Miami. See id. When the men returned together, a consensual search of their
luggage revealed a small amount of marijuana. See id.
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narcotics investigator" prepared an application for a warrant to search the three
residences and automobiles belonging to all of the suspects. 3 This application
was reviewed by several Deputy District Attorneys. a" A search warrant was issued
and its execution led to the discovery of large quantities of drugs and the
subsequent arrest of the three subjects. 3°5
The defendants filed motions to suppress the drugs and the District Court
granted them in part.' The judge granted the motion because he found that there
was not sufficient probable cause to justify the issuance of the warrant.3 ° The
District Court denied the government's Motion for Reconsideration and the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the ruling,"2 rejecting the government's
request to create a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule when evidence is
seized in a reasonable, good faith reliance on a search warrant.
3 9
The Supreme Court reversed; 310 it held that when evidence is seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment by officers acting reasonably and in good faith
reliance on a warrant, its admissibility is not barred by the exclusionary rule.31'
Under the Pepperdine Proposal, the procedural maneuvering in the criminal
case would be streamlined. Leon and his colleagues would presumably not even
file a motion to suppress, because of their inability to show that the officers
knowingly and intentionally violated the Fourth Amendment.3 2 Although there
was insufficient probable cause to justify the issuance of the warrant, the trial court
made an express finding in Leon that the officer who applied for the warrant acted
in good faith.3"3 In the unlikely event the defendants filed a motion to suppress, the
good faith finding by the criminal judge would be unnecessary. Instead, the judge
who heard the motion to suppress would need to determine only whether a knowing
and intentional violation of Leon and his associates' rights had occurred.3" 4 Of
course, the judge would not find a knowing and intentional violation of
constitutional rights, and thus, the evidence seized would be admissible in the
303. See id. at 902.
304. See id.
305. See id.
306. See id. at 903. Some of the drugs seized were admissible because none of the defendants had
standing to challenge all of the searches. See id.
307. See id. at 903 n.2, 904.
308. See id. at 904 (citations omitted).
309. See id.
310. See id. at 905.
311. Seeid. at922.
312. See id. at 922-23.
313. See id. at 904.
314. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 754.
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criminal prosecution."'
However, because the defendants suffered a Fourth Amendment violation, they
would be entitled, under our proposal, to pursue compensatory damages in the
administrative proceeding after the conclusion of their criminal trial. As discussed
in section C above, to determine whether they are entitled to compensatory
damages, the administrative judge would decide whether the officers acted in good
faith.3"6 The officers would present testimony of their reliance on informants, the
extensive investigation, the surveillance of the defendants'homes and cars, and the
fact that they had several Deputy District Attorneys review their application for a
warrant.31 This testimony would demonstrate that the officers acted in good
faith. " 8 Thus, the officers would not be civilly liable for their constitutional
violations.3"9
Consequently, although there was a Fourth Amendment violation, the evidence
seized would be admissible in a criminal prosecution and the officers who
committed that violation, because they acted in good faith, would not be civilly
liable.32 This outcome is consistent with the Court's observation that when a
constitutional violation occurs where the officer is acting in good faith, "'the
deterrence rationale loses much of its force."'
321
D. Intentional or Reckless Violations on Innocent People: The Ordeal of
Robert L. Wilkins
On May 8, 1992, Robert L. Wilkins, an African-American Deputy Public
Defender, was riding in a car with his family on their way home from a funeral.322
His car was stopped for speeding by a Maryland Police Officer who claimed that
the car was traveling sixty miles-per-hour in a forty miles-per-hour zone. 23 After
issuing Wilkins' cousin a speeding ticket, the officer asked for permission to search
the car.324 Wilkins reminded the officer that searching a car without probable cause
is unconstitutional. 325 The officer, apparently not as knowledgeable as Wilkins in
315. Seeid.
316. See supra Part V.C.
317. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 901-02.
318. See id. at 904. Pursuant to the government's request, the District Court in Leon made an express
finding that the officer who applied for the warrant acted in good faith. See id.
319. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 746-47.
320. See id.
321. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531,539 (1975) (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,
447 (1974)).
322. See Jennifer A. Larabee, Note, "DWB (Driving While Black)" and Equal Protection: The
Realities of an Unconstitutional Police Practice, 6 J.L. & POL'Y 291,291 (1997) (arguing for a new
equal protection test for analyzing consideration of race by police in detaining motorists for traffic
violations).
323. See id.
324. See id. at 291-92.
325. See id. at 292.
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Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, disregarded Wilkins and continued to press for
consent to search the car.326 When the family refused to allow him to search the
car, the officer ordered the occupants out of the car and made them stand in the rain
for half-an-hour while he summoned police dogs to complete a search. 327 The dogs
did not find any contraband.32
Wilkins and his family filed a lawsuit against the Maryland State Police
Department and eventually received a $50,000 settlement.3 29 Wilkins was guilty
of nothing more than "Driving While Black"33 and the police who make such
pretextual stops are rarely held accountable for their conduct. Victims in Wilkins'
position do not benefit from the exclusionary rule as a remedy for Fourth
Amendment violations because nothing was found, there was nothing to exclude,
and thus, nothing to prosecute.33' Ironically, the only group that receives any
benefit from the rule are criminals who gain the advantage of having some or all
of the evidence of their crimes excluded in prosecutions against them. The civil
administrative remedy eliminates that anomaly, giving innocent victims more
effective and accessible relief.
Under our proposal, Wilkins could initiate the administrative process by filing
a written complaint with the enforcement arm of the responsible administrative
agency.332 The filing would begin a preliminary review of the complaint to
determine if the facts alleged constitute a violation.333 If the preliminary
investigation determined that the complaint was without merit, the, administrative
process would end. 34
However, under the alleged facts, it is apparent that a violation occurred.
Wilkins would be represented in the administrative process by an agency lawyer,
thus eliminating the substantial costs he presumably incurred in bringing his section
1983 claim. A hearing would follow in which Wilkins would have to establish by
a preponderance of the evidence that a constitutional violation had occurred.
35
Wilkins would satisfy this burden by presenting circumstantial evidence that the
326. See id. The officer went so far as to advise Wilkins and his family that it was the "regular
practice of the Maryland State Police to search motor vehicles." See id.
327. See id. at 292.
328. See id.
329. See id.
330. See generally David A. Harris, Whren v. United States: Pretextual Traffic Stops and 'Driving
While Black', 21 MAR CHAMPION 41 (1997) (discussing pretextual searches which are racially
motivated).
331. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 674-75.
332. See id. at 745.
333. See id.
334. See id.
335. See id. at 747.
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stated reason for stopping him was a mere pretext. The burden would then shift to
the officer to establish that she acted in good faith.336 The officer, under this set of
facts, would not likely be able to make such a showing as there was no legitimate
basis on which to justify searching Wilkins' car. Consequently, the hearing would
move to the damages phase.
Wilkins would be entitled to punitive damages, subject to a cap, if the
administrative judge determined that the officer knowingly and intentionally
violated Wilkins' rights.337 If the judge did not find a knowing and intentional
violation, Wilkins would be entitled to receive liquidated damages for the violation
at a preset amount, regardless of any actual economic or non-economic harm.331
Thus, under the Pepperdine Proposal, the victim of a constitutional violation who
has not committed a crime would still be able to obtain relief.
E. Other Applications Beyond the Courtroom
Our proposal would also benefit those who suffer constitutional violations in
situations where courts, despite the acknowledgment of a constitutional violation,
have elected not to apply the exclusionary rule. For example, in Pennsylvania
Board of Probation & Parole v. Scott,339 the Court held that parole boards are not
required by federal law to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. 3" In Scott, the defendant, after being convicted of third-degree
murder, was placed on parole.34' One of the conditions of his parole was that he
was to refrain from owning or possessing firearms or any other weapons.342 After
Scott was arrested for various parole violations, officers illegally searched his home
and found five firearms, a compound bow, and three arrows.343 At the parole
hearing, Scott was recommitted on the basis of the weapons found during the
illegal search and sentenced to serve thirty-six months in prison.3" The Court
acknowledged the illegality of the search that produced the weapons, but declined
to apply the exclusionary rule to parole hearings.345
The rationale behind the Court's decision was based on the notion "that the
State's use of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment does not
itself violate the Constitution."3 6 Rather, the Court observed that the exclusionary
336. See id.
337. See id. at 748-49.
338. See id. at 749.
339. 118 S. Ct. 2014 (1998).
340. See id. at 2017-18.
341. See id. at 2018.
342. See id.
343. See id.
344. See id.
345. See id. at 2023.
346. See id. at 2019 (citations omitted).
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rule is a judicially created remedy to deter illegal searches and seizures.3 47 Our
proposal embraces this rationale by providing a remedy to victims of constitutional
violations even in cases where the exclusionary rule does not apply. "
Perhaps this is the greatest advantage of the civil administrative remedy. It
applies to everyone, including criminals who suffer the most egregious police
misconduct and innocent victims of a police officer's ignorance of constitutional
law. By replacing a remedy that benefits only the guilty and is inapplicable to those
who have not committed a crime, the Pepperdine Proposal protects the
constitutional rights of everyone in a manner palatable to society.
F. Coming Full Circle: The Civil Administrative Remedy and Judge Baer
In United States v. Bayless,349 Judge Baer first granted a defendant's Motion
to Suppress eighty pounds of cocaine and heroin and then reversed himself and
admitted the drugs on a Motion for Reconsideration by the government.350 In his
first opinion, Judge Baer decried the reliance of the arresting police officers on
stereotypes of the defendant and the community in which she was arrested.351 Baer
even quoted President John F. Kennedy: "'The great enemy of truth is very often
not the lie--deliberate, contrived, and dishonest--but the myth--persistent, pervasive,
and realistic."'352 In granting Bayless's Motion to Suppress the drugs found in the
trunk of defendant's car, the judge bluntly stated: "I find [Bayless's] statement to
be credible and reject the testimony proffered by [the arresting officer]."33
After the tremendous public outcry at the suppression of the drugs and a
rehearing,354 Baer changed his mind and his decision;355 Judge Baer apologized to
the police officers356 and praised the United States Attorney's Office for their
commendable preparation of witnesses that he had previously characterized as
liars.357 Judge Baer's sudden about-face demonstrates the myth of the exclusionary
rule: that the rule is applied fairly and is an effective remedy for Fourth
347. See id. (citations omitted).
348. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 750.
349. 913 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), vacated, 921 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
350. See Bayless, 921 F. Supp. at 212.
351. See id. at 240.
352. See id. at 234 (quoting President John F. Kennedy, Commencement Speech, Yale University
1962).
353. See id.
354. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 671-72 nn.2-3.
355. See Bayless, 921 F. Supp at 212.
356. See id. at 217.
357. See id. at 215 n.5.
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Amendment violations.
Under our proposal, Baer would not have to decide between suppressing the
eighty pounds of drugs, thus causing the dismissal of the case and the angry public
reprisals, or validating a seizure that occurred under questionable circumstances.
Instead, Baer would have to decide only whether the police search and seizure, if
improper, was a knowing and intentional violation of Bayless's rights. This point
would be difficult to prove, and Baer could legitimately deny the suppression
motion while still preserving the defendant's right to pursue the civil administrative
remedy. By giving judges an alternative besides setting the guilty free, the civil
administrative remedy both redresses constitutional violations and maintains the
public's faith in the criminal justice system.
Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion in Leon, 5 pronounced that "the
scope of the exclusionary rule is subject to change in light of changing judicial
understanding about the effects of the rule outside the confines of the
courtroom." '359 We agree. It is our hope that the Pepperdine Proposal, or any
discussion it might generate, can contribute to that change.
358. 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
359. See id. at 928 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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